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Do the Securities Laws Promote
Short-Termism?
James J. Park*
Since 1970, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required public
companies to file reports summarizing their financial performance on a quarterly basis. Such
mandatory quarterly disclosure has recently been criticized as incentivizing corporations to
deliver short-term results rather than developing sustainable, long-term strategies. This Article
examines the origins of the quarterly reporting system to assess whether the SEC should reduce
the frequency of periodic filings. It concludes that much of the pressure on public companies to
deliver short-term results emerged as the market increasingly focused on earnings projections
issued by research analysts. The pressure to meet such projections can distort the behavior of
public companies, but such distortions will only be significant in certain circumstances. Because
it is unclear that the quarterly reporting system substantially impacts company incentives, the
SEC should pursue modest reforms rather than take the radical step of eliminating quarterly
disclosure. Quarterly disclosure is one example of how securities law tends to promote the
short-term interests of transacting investors. In contrast, corporate law, which mediates the
interests of shareholders, often gives managers the discretion to consider long-term interests.
Strong securities law can be balanced by weak corporate law.
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INTRODUCTION
The market value of a public company rises and falls based on its ability to
meet the expectations of investors. In a well-established quarterly ritual, companies
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release financial statements that will be closely scrutinized by the market.1 If a
company does not meet forecasts of its performance, its stock price can plummet.2
Corporate managers may be replaced if they do not consistently meet
quarterly projections.
Over the last several years, some of the most prominent representatives of
Corporate America have argued that the pressure of mandatory quarterly disclosure
creates incentives for public corporations to focus on meeting the short-term
expectations of the market rather than developing businesses that prosper over the
long-term and make positive contributions to society.3 The criticism of quarterly
disclosure gained momentum in the fall of 2018 when President Trump asked the
SEC to consider whether it should only require annual or semiannual disclosure to
reduce the burden of quarterly scrutiny on public companies.4 The SEC responded

1. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contains the basic mandate of periodic
disclosure. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012). Companies subject to Section 13 must file an annual report as
well as quarterly reports. See SEC, FORM 10-K (2018) [hereinafter FORM 10-K]; SEC, FORM 10-Q (2018)
[hereinafter FORM 10-Q].
2. See, e.g., FIN. EXECS. RESEARCH FOUND., FIN. EXECS. INT’L, A SURVEY OF INVESTOR
RELATIONS AND EARNINGS GUIDANCE 3 (2015) (“There is often a stock market reward for meeting
or beating expectations and a penalty for failing to do so.”).
3. Martin Lipton, the prominent corporate lawyer, is a long-time critic of short-termism and
proposed eliminating quarterly disclosure in 2015. David Benoit, Time to End Quarterly Reports, Law
Firm Says, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/time-to-end-quarterly-reportslaw-firm-says-1440025715 [ https://perma.cc/6LC6-TT4T ]; see also Steven A. Rosenblum,
Corporations: The Short-Termism Debate, 85 MISS. L.J. 697, 709 (2016) (“[E]very publicly traded
company is subject to what I think of as the tyranny of quarterly earnings. If you miss your quarterly
earnings, you get punished, and that’s just a fact of life for every public company, and that’s been true
before activists.”). In 2018, Jamie Dimon, the CEO of J.P. Morgan, and the legendary investor Warren
Buffett proposed that companies no longer issue guidance about their earnings. See Jamie Dimon
& Warren E. Buffett, Short-Termism Is Harming the Economy: Public Companies Should Reduce or
Eliminate the Practice of Estimating Quarterly Earnings, WALL ST. J. ( June 6, 2018), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/short-termism-is-harming-the-economy-1528336801
[ https://perma.cc/
9S3D-SRKK ]. Periodically, commentators have observed that the focus of markets on quarterly
earnings results in short-termism. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND
CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 134–35
(1995) (describing proposal to eliminate quarterly reports to address market myopia); ROBERT
G. ECCLES ET AL., THE VALUEREPORTING REVOLUTION: MOVING BEYOND THE EARNINGS GAME
4 (2001) (“[M]anagers, analysts, and shareholders feel themselves trapped in a short-term earnings game
that none of them really likes, but all see no choice but to play.”); MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM
AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR BUSINESS MYOPIA 32 (1991) (“Business leaders complain
that pressures from shareholders to meet short-term performance bogeys are undermining their ability
MITCHELL,
CORPORATE
to
build
competitive
enterprises.”);
LAWRENCE
IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 133 (2001) (proposing elimination of quarterly
disclosure); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1019 (2013)
(“From the perspective of radical shareholder primacy, management would violate its duty as agent of
the shareholders if it were to pursue some other objective that had the effect of reducing quarterly
earnings, such as the long-run sustainability of the corporation or some kind of social
responsibility agenda.”).
4. Dave Michaels et al., Trump Asks SEC to Ease Earnings Reporting, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18,
2018, at A1. The order came in the form of a Tweet and was prompted by a conversation with the CEO
of Pepsi.
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to the presidential request by asking for comments on the question of whether the
“existing periodic reporting system . . . foster[s] an inefficient outlook among
registrants and market participants by focusing on short-term results.”5
The proposal to eliminate quarterly disclosure connects to a heated debate
about whether short-termism, where public companies take “actions that are
profitable in the short term but value-decreasing in the long term,”6 is a significant
problem. Over the last several years, legal scholars have generally focused on activist
hedge funds as the primary driver of short-termism.7 Much of the debate has
focused on the implications of such activism for corporate law.8
Given the efforts over the last few decades to increase disclosure obligations,9
the proposal to eliminate quarterly disclosure seems problematic and unworthy of
much discussion.10 There is limited evidence that short-termism causes significant
problems for publicly traded companies.11 Even if it did, changing the frequency of

5. Request for Comment on Earnings Releases and Quarterly Reports, Securities Act Release
No. 33-10588, Exchange Act Release No. 34-84842 (Dec. 18, 2018).
6. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1638–39 (2013); see also Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term
Shareholders, 124 YALE L.J. 1554, 1558 (2015) (defining short-termism as “taking steps that boost the
short-term stock price but reduce the economic value created by the firm over the long term”).
7. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can
Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 8 (2010) (“[M]any activist investors hold their stock for a very short period of
time and may have the potential to reap profits based on short-term trading strategies that arbitrage
corporate policies.”); see also Jeff Schwartz, De Facto Shareholder Primacy, 79
U. MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that hedge funds leverage transparency to pressure
companies to maximize shareholder wealth). Before hedge fund activism became somewhat common,
the rise of hostile takeovers and pressure from institutional investors were criticized as the primary
contributors to short-termism. See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of
Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 203 (1991) (“The
ascendency of the institutional stockholder and the hostile takeover, however, creates an emphasis on
short-term results that makes it increasingly difficult for the corporation to maintain the long-term
focus necessary to its own and society’s well-being.”); see also MITCHELL, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that
the “root” of short-termism “is the corporate structure itself . . . .”).
8. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 6 (describing prevalence of the short-termism argument in
corporate law); Strine, supra note 7 (describing short-termism as a corporate governance problem); see
also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439,
439 (2001) (noting widespread agreement that “corporate law should principally strive to increase
long-term shareholder value”).
9. See, e.g., Acceleration of Periodic Report Filing Dates and Disclosure Concerning Website
Access to Reports, Securities Act Release No. 33-8128, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-46464
(Sept. 5, 2002) (“[W]e believe that periodic reports contain valuable information for investors.”).
10. A group of posts on the Columbia Law School Blue Sky Blog documented the early reactions
of several leading securities law scholars to the Trump proposal. See August 2018, CLS BLUE SKY
BLOG, https://www.clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2018/08/ [ https://perma.cc/4J9P-QWVA ].
11. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Stock Market Short-Termism’s Impact, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 71, 87 (2018)
(presenting evidence that “short-term theory is either unsupported (R&D), contradicted (buybacks as
draining cash, stock markets as shunning the future), or better explained otherwise (capital
expenditure)”); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1085 (2015) (finding no evidence that hedge fund activism reduces long-term
performance); Fried, supra note 6 (arguing that focus on long-term value can reduce economic value for
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disclosure to a semiannual or annual basis would do little to check the problem.
Reducing mandatory disclosure would likely increase the volatility of stock prices,
reduce liquidity, and increase insider trading.12
But the short-termism objection to quarterly disclosure is worth analyzing
because it raises the interesting question of whether policies to protect investors,
which have generally been uncontroversial, can have a negative impact on corporate
decision-making. The fact that securities regulators in other jurisdictions have
rejected mandatory quarterly disclosure on short-termism grounds raises the
possibility of a flaw in the U.S. approach.13 Core aspects of securities regulation may
have a broad negative impact on the governance of public companies.
This Article contributes to the debate about the frequency of periodic
disclosure by tracing the origins of quarterly reporting. The modern quarterly
reporting system has two components.14 First, the securities laws mandate quarterly
disclosure for public companies. Second, investors judge the results reported in such
disclosure in relation to quarterly projections of financial results. Rather than looking
solely at the frequency of disclosure as the cause of short-termism, this Article
examines how other factors, such as the reliability of disclosure and evaluation of
disclosure through projections, are important contributors.
The quarterly reporting system reflects a closely intertwined blend of
government regulation and private ordering. Both quarterly disclosure and quarterly
projections originated independently from SEC regulation. Quarterly disclosure of
earnings was required by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) decades before
the SEC mandated it in 1970. Projections, which are typically issued by research
analysts, became common in the 1960s, at a time when SEC policy sought to
discourage them. Since the late 1970s, the SEC has reinforced the legitimacy of a
a corporation that transacts in its own shares); Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias (ECGI
Working Paper Series in Law, Paper No. 449, 2019), https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3338631
[ https://perma.cc/3HTA-8ZU9 ] (arguing that long-term bias where “managers systematically
overestimate the value of their own long-term projects” is of equal concern as short-term bias).
12. Disclosure has many benefits that have been well-documented. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox
et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy, and Economic Performance: The New Evidence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 331,
339–40 (2003) (describing benefits of disclosure); Renhui Fu et al., Financial Reporting Frequency,
Information Asymmetry, and the Cost of Equity, 54 J. ACCT. & ECON. 132 (2012) (finding that increase
in interim reporting frequency reduced information asymmetry and the cost of equity).
13. The EU and some other jurisdictions have rejected mandatory quarterly disclosure on the
ground that it promotes short-termism. See, e.g., Sanjeev Bhojraj & Robert Libby, Capital Market
Pressure, Disclosure Frequency-Induced Earnings/Cash Flow Conflict, and Managerial Myopia, 80
ACCT. REV. 1 (2005); see also JOHN KAY, THE KAY REVIEW OF UK EQUITY MARKETS AND
LONG-TERM DECISION MAKING 9 (2012) (concluding that “short-termism is a problem in UK
equity markets”).
14. The point that the reporting system is broader than “simply reporting numbers” has been
long recognized. See, e.g., A.A. Sommer, Jr., An Overview of the Issues, in PUBLIC REPORTING OF
CORPORATE FINANCIAL FORECASTS 1, 8 (Prem Prakash & Alfred Rappaport eds., 1974) (noting that
“financial reporting” encompasses disclosure and “also the stating of information that is necessary for
meaningful interpretation of the numbers, it means projecting and forecasting future developments”).
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system that judges companies based on their quarterly results. For example, it has
emphasized the importance of issuing quarterly disclosure that accurately reflects
whether a company has met market projections.
The evidence most clearly points to projections as the main source of pressure
on public companies. Public companies reported quarterly earnings for decades
without feeling the pressure of short-termism. It was not until quarterly projections
became widely distributed that short-termism became an issue. By the late 1990s,
quarterly projections were linked to fraud where companies destroyed long-term
value to deliver short-term performance. More recently, public company managers
report that they are willing to cut R&D expenditures to meet a projection.
It is important to acknowledge that projections should only create problematic
short-term pressure on managers in certain situations. If market expectations are
too high, managers can convey that projections should be lowered. On the other
hand, managers can have an incentive to strive to meet unrealistically high
projections. If they cannot generate sufficient performance to meet such
projections, they may resort to measures that boost short-term performance but
destroy long-term value.
If projections are the main source of short-termism, reform should be directed
at such projections rather than taking the more radical step of reducing quarterly
disclosure. Increasing the obligation of public companies to provide their own
projections and the assumptions behind such projections might reduce the risk that
they are judged by unrealistic expectations. While relaxing requirements about the
reliability of quarterly results could reduce the pressure of the quarterly reporting
system, doing so would also adversely affect its integrity. Modest reform is
warranted given the limited evidence that public companies are sacrificing
substantial long-term value. The quarterly reporting system likely tilts public
companies broadly towards short-termism, but it is unclear that the degree of such
pressure is severe.
The impact of the quarterly reporting system on the management of public
corporations may be muted because corporate law emphasizes different
considerations than securities law. Because securities regulation primarily facilitates
securities transactions,15 it generally favors short-term investors who purchase and
sell securities more frequently than long-term investors. In contrast, rather than
focusing on the narrow interests of investors when transacting, corporate law more
broadly governs the interests of investors while they own a stock.
The dispersed shareholders of public companies have famously been
described as weak relative to company managers.16 As securities regulation has
evolved to meet the needs of markets that have become more liquid and demanding
over time, the power of shareholders has increased. Managers have been able to

15. See, e.g., James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 64
UCLA L. REV. 116 (2017) (arguing that the securities laws focus on transactions).
16. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1996).
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resist stronger securities law because corporate law gives them discretion to consider
the long-term interests of the corporation. To an extent, weaker corporate law
favoring managerial discretion is a way of addressing the tendency of securities law
to favor transacting investors. Put another way, strong securities law can be
balanced by weak corporate law.
Part I of this Article describes the origins of the modern quarterly reporting
system. Part II examines how the quarterly reporting system affects the incentive of
public corporations and investors to focus on short-term results. Part III weighs
proposals for reforming the quarterly reporting system to check short-termism. Part
IV concludes by showing how the short-termism promoted by securities law has
been checked by corporate law, which gives managers discretion to consider the
long-term interests of the company.
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE QUARTERLY REPORTING SYSTEM
The problem of short-termism did not immediately commence with the SEC’s
creation of Form 10-Q in 1970. A quarterly disclosure mandate by itself was not
enough to significantly affect managerial time horizons. Many public corporations
disclosed earnings results on a quarterly basis before 1970, but such quarterly
disclosure was not viewed as incentivizing public companies to focus on the short
term. It was not until company filings became more reliable and commonly judged
by projections that managerial incentives were significantly impacted by the
quarterly reporting system.
Pressure to deliver financial results began to emerge as investors increasingly
relied on projections in assessing company performance.17 By the end of the 1960s,
a significant number of analysts attempted to predict the yearly earnings of major
public companies. Despite the SEC’s policy of prohibiting companies from
including projections in their filings with the agency, some companies released their
own projections, and many selectively disclosed information to analysts to shape
expectations about their future performance. By the mid-1980s, quarterly earnings
projections were widely dispersed and used by markets to assess managerial
competence. As quarterly results became more important over the course of the
1990s, the SEC increased its expectations about the accuracy of such results,
reinforcing the pressure to meet short-term projections.

17. The link between investor preferences and short-termism has been widely acknowledged.
See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk’s
Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006) (arguing that “increasing
sway of institutional investors over corporations” resulted in focus on growing earnings that caused
corporate scandal); see also MATTEO TONELLO, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, REVISITING STOCK
MARKET SHORT-TERMISM 6 (2006) (linking short-termism to rise of institutions and changes in tax
policies that made short-term trading more profitable).
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The modern quarterly reporting system thus arose through a combination of
government mandate and private ordering. Quarterly disclosure that became more
reliable over time through SEC regulation interacted with projections that
originated primarily from private research analysts.
A. Quarterly Disclosure
Many public companies issued quarterly disclosure for decades before it was
mandated by the SEC, but the earliest versions of such disclosure were not viewed
as trustworthy. For a variety of reasons, starting in the 1970s, the SEC sought more
uniformity and accuracy with respect to quarterly filings. It was not until periodic
disclosure became sufficiently reliable that it could be used to systematically assess
the financial performance of companies.
1. A Signal of Quality
Prior to 1970, many public companies listed on exchanges provided quarterly
reports to investors. The NYSE had required such disclosure of all listed companies
since the 1930s,18 though it gave companies significant discretion in what they
would report.
As many scholars have observed, stock exchanges, which provide a liquid and
orderly market for trading in a company’s stock, have an economic incentive to
develop regulation that facilitates trading.19 Exchanges generate much of their
revenue by charging commissions for executing trades. If companies listed on an
exchange do not provide enough information to the market, investors will trade less
because they will not be confident that their trades are made at a reasonable
valuation. On the other hand, if exchanges require too much regulation of
companies, more companies will choose not to list their stock on the exchange.
Exchanges must balance the interests of investors and public companies. In a sense,
their rules are meant to reflect the agreement that these parties would negotiate.20
The NYSE’s early mandate of quarterly disclosure was a way of differentiating
itself from competitors. Its primary rival, the American Stock Exchange (AMEX),
did not require quarterly disclosure until 1962.21 Public companies of higher quality
are both able to invest resources in reporting and more confident in sharing details
about their performance. With its comparatively stringent listing standards, the
18. See Exchange Encourages Interim Financial Reports, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE
BULLETIN, Aug. 1939, at 2; see also GILBERT W. COOKE, THE STOCK MARKETS 216 (1964).
19. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, The Origin of the New York Stock Exchange, 1791–1860, 27 J. LEGAL
STUD. 113 (1998); Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange As Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1457 (1997);
A.C. Pritchard, Markets As Monitors: A Proposal to Replace Class Actions with Exchanges As Securities
Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REV. 925, 963–81 (1999).
20. See generally F RANK H. E ASTERBROOK & D ANIEL R. F ISCHEL , T HE E CONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996).
21. See, e.g., Richard W. Leftwich et al., Voluntary Corporate Disclosure: The Case of Interim
Reporting, 19 J. ACCT. RES. 50, 52–54 (1981) (describing the evolution of exchange
disclosure requirements).
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NYSE could signal that its companies were better investments than stocks listed on
other exchanges.22 The AMEX’s niche was smaller companies that did not meet the
higher standards of the NYSE but might be attractive to investors willing to take
on more risk.23 By choosing to list with the NYSE, companies could differentiate
themselves from less reputable firms.
Even before the securities laws mandated quarterly disclosure, public investors
had access to quarterly earnings data for major public companies. At least a decade
before the SEC released Form 10-Q, the Value Line Investment Survey published
quarterly financial information in chart form for about a thousand companies. An
investor could look at the January 1963 issue and find tabular quarterly sales and
earnings per share information for hundreds of public companies from the start of
1957 through the end of 1962.24
Many public companies were thus reporting quarterly results decades before
short-termism emerged as a problem. As has been well-documented, the period
spanning the 1950s through the 1960s was characterized by significant deference to
corporate managers.25 Large public companies were not as scrutinized by investors
and felt they had the discretion to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders
rather than just shareholders.26 They had a long-term rather than a short-term
perspective. As the management guru Peter Drucker wrote in 1954, “every basic
management decision is a long-range decision—with ten years a rather short
time-span in these days.”27 Despite the fact that many public companies released
quarterly earnings results to the market, they did not feel compelled to focus on
short-term performance.
Rather than fixate on quarterly results, investors evaluated a company’s
earnings over longer periods. As Warren Buffet’s teacher, the Columbia professor
Benjamin Graham, noted in the 1973 edition of the Intelligent Investor: “[I]nvestors
paid considerable attention to the average earnings over a fairly long period in the
past—usually from seven to ten years. This ‘mean figure’ was . . . thought to give a

22. See, e.g., Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 520 F.2d 1373, 1381 (1975) (“[T]o the American
investing public listing on the New York Stock Exchange carries with it implicit guarantees
of trustworthiness.”).
23. See, e.g., HILLEL BLACK, THE WATCHDOGS OF WALL STREET 223 (1962) (describing the
American Stock Exchange “as a seasoning ground for new companies”); ROBERT SOBEL, THE
CURBSTONE BROKERS 21–40 (1970) (describing rivalry between exchanges).
24. See VALUE LINE, COMPLETE OVERVIEW: THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY
4 (1963).
25. See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive It?, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1647 (2011) (describing post-war period where “[w]ith relatively few
exceptions, no one pressured corporate managements to run their companies from quarter to quarter
to meet the expectations of stock analysts or institutional shareholders, and only rarely were there
efforts to pressure managers to manage for the short-term by threatening to oust them from office”).
26. See, e.g., R OBERT A ARON G ORDON , B USINESS L EADERSHIP IN THE L ARGE
CORPORATION xii (5th prtg. 1961) (noting that “the maintenance of satisfactory profits is a more
accurate statement of the profits objective than is complete profits-maximization”).
27. PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 88 (1954).
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better idea of the company’s earning power than the results of the latest year
alone.”28 The stock market for a time thus did not pressure public companies to
generate quarterly or even annual results.
Even after they were initially required, there was skepticism about whether
quarterly disclosure conveyed reliable information. When the NYSE first mandated
them in 1939, it warned that such reports “cannot represent more than the most
accurate estimates possible” because “[t]hree months are considered by
corporations in some fields of business as too short a period within which to
attempt to approximate costs with accuracy or finality.”29 The preparation of
disclosure requires an inevitable “element of judgment” that “must be multiplied
many fold in the case of quarterly statements.”30 Without confidence in their
reliability, for decades, quarterly reports were not viewed as a way of accurately
measuring the performance of companies.
Thus, the frequency of disclosure by itself could not have been the sole cause
of corporate short-termism. It was not until the market could trust the information
in such disclosure that they became the basis for judging the performance of
public companies.
2. Uniformity and Reliability
Over time, SEC regulation shaped quarterly disclosure so it could eventually
become the primary metric for judging company performance. The SEC did not
intend to create a system that would pressure companies to continually satisfy
investor expectations. But its policies of protecting investors from fraud and
facilitating the efficiency of markets have had the effect of influencing the
decision-making horizons of public company managers.
At least initially, the federal securities laws did not substantially supplement
the disclosure practices of exchanges. The primary regulatory concern was the sale
of securities, especially by unproven businesses. Over time, the SEC turned to the
disclosure practices of established public companies. The SEC became more
concerned with ensuring that trading in secondary markets that set the value for a
public corporation’s stock was based on uniform and reliable information.
A series of SEC studies of securities markets starting in the 1940s found higher
rates of fraud and lower levels of disclosure for companies that were not traded on
an exchange.31 Until 1964, such over-the-counter companies were not even subject
to annual periodic disclosure requirements. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
which requires such additional disclosure, initially only applied to companies listed
on an exchange. This gap in regulation created the opportunity for regulatory

28. BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 172 (4th rev. ed. 1973).
29. Exchange Encourages Interim Financial Reports, supra note 18, at 2.
30. Id.
31. Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9
J. CORP. L. 1, 34–45 (1983) (describing findings of SEC studies).
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arbitrage. The ability to avoid regulation by delisting from an exchange limited the
ability of stock exchanges to mandate quality disclosure of listed companies.32
The SEC’s first move in regulating periodic disclosure was to require
uniformity in the disclosure practices of all public companies, regardless of whether
they traded on a stock exchange. The Securities Acts Amendments of 1964 applied
the disclosure requirements of the Exchange Act to any company exceeding
minimum thresholds of investors and assets.33 Thus, companies that may not have
qualified for exchange listings or were purposely not listing to avoid regulation were
now subject to periodic disclosure regulation.
By eliminating an opportunity for regulatory arbitrage, the SEC laid the
foundation for increasing the frequency of reporting. Until 1970, the SEC only
required public companies to file disclosures on a semiannual basis.34 As the system
was described in 1966: “[F]irst in importance is an annual report (Form 10-K under
the 1934 Act, for most issuers) . . . containing certified financial
statements . . . . Second, there is a required semiannual report (Form 9-K) containing
a few basic financial data, on an uncertified basis.”35
After an extensive study of the disclosure practices of public companies by
SEC Commissioner Francis Wheat found that the quality of the quarterly reports
mandated by stock exchanges was not uniform,36 the SEC promptly moved to take
control of quarterly disclosure. The SEC considered a continuous disclosure system,
where companies would be required to promptly disclose any material information
but rejected it as “unduly burdensome and duplicative of the timely disclosure
policies of the major stock exchanges.”37 It thus settled on the compromise of
quarterly disclosure of company information. Notably, unlike the prior semiannual
32. See SEC, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
UNDER THE ‘33 AND ‘34 ACTS 62 (1969) [hereinafter WHEAT REPORT].
33. Securities Acts Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, 78 Stat. 565 (1964) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 78c, 78l–78o, 78o-3, 78p, 78t, 78w, 78ff (2012)).
34. From 1945 until 1953, the SEC required quarterly disclosure of sales and revenue of public
companies. See Notice of Proposed Adoption of Form 9-K and Rules X-13A-13 and X-15D-13,
Securities Act Release No. 33-3529, Exchange Act Release No. 34-5129 ( Jan. 27, 1955). The early
attempts to mandate quarterly disclosure were resisted by managers and supported by analysts who
reported difficulty in obtaining quarterly sales information from companies. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The
Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market
Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1549 (2007) (citing 2 LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 809–57
(2d ed. 1961)).
35. Milton H. Cohen, “Truth in Securities” Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340, 1356–57 (1966);
see also Adoption of Form 9-K and Rules X-13A-13 and X-15D-13, Securities Act Release No. 33-3553,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-5189 ( June 23, 1955). In addition, companies were required to file
interim disclosures on Form 8-K for specified events. See Cohen, supra, at 1357.
36. WHEAT REPORT, supra note 32, at 39 (“It was readily apparent (and acknowledged by
representatives of the exchanges) that they varied from extremely useful to extremely poor and
uninformative.”); see also Cohen, supra note 35, at 1363 (“The contents of such interim reports are not
prescribed in any detail, and the full disclosure standards of the federal statutes do not apply.”).
37. Proposal to Adopt Form 10-Q Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and to Rescind Forms 8-K and 9-K under that Act, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-8683 (Sept. 15, 1969).

First to Printer_Park (Do Not Delete)

1002

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/17/2020 7:31 AM

[Vol. 10:991

Form 9-K disclosures, the new Form 10-Q would have to be “prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and practices on a
consistent basis.”38
These new regulatory requirements reflected a change in the demands of
investors who essentially negotiated a new contract with public companies. The
increase in periodic disclosure coincided with substantial changes in securities
markets and their participants.39 Institutional investors had become more
prominent and some of them traded more frequently than retail investors. One
explanation for the SEC’s new policy is that it sought to meet the needs of
such investors.
In addition to uniformity, federal regulation has sought to improve the
reliability of securities disclosure. Until the 1970s, the most important disclosure
document was the registration statement filed by a company when it sold
securities.40 This registration statement was subject to high standards of accuracy
enforced by Section 11 of the Securities Act,41 which prohibits any material
misrepresentation in a registration statement. In contrast, the securities laws did not
initially require as much for periodic disclosure reports.42 As Milton Cohen wrote
in a famous article on the disclosure system published in the Harvard Law Review,
“the disclosure process under the 1934 Act . . . appears never to have been taken
quite as seriously under the 1933 Act, very likely because of differences in the
attendant liabilities and sanctions and in Commission procedure.”43
In the wake of a wave of foreign bribery scandals by public companies in the
mid-1970s,44 Congress questioned how an established public company could make
payments to win foreign business that were not reflected in its financial statements.
It passed a statute, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,45 which requires that

38. Adoption of Form 10-Q, Rescission of Form 9-K and Amendment of Rules 13a-13 and
15d-13, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-9004 (Oct. 28, 1970). There was no such requirement
for Form 9-K. See Adoption of Form 9-K and Rules X-13A-13 and X-15D-13, supra note 35.
39. See, e.g., WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN, JR., THE SECURITIES MARKETS 44 (1971)
(noting changes in markets that resulted in an “unexpected syndrome of go-go speculation for
short-term performance”).
40. Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (2012).
41. Id. § 77k.
42. For example, the Wheat Report expressed the view that quarterly earnings statements would
not trigger liability for misrepresentations because they reported estimates. See WHEAT REPORT, supra
note 32, at 339.
43. Cohen, supra note 35, at 1361; see also Gordon, supra note 34, at 1550 (noting that the SEC
“sought to ratchet up the 1934 Act periodic filings to the same depth and currency as would be expected
of a 1933 Act registration statement”). At the time he wrote, it was unclear whether Rule 10b-5 reached
misstatements by public companies relating to their ongoing condition. See, e.g., Joseph v. Farnsworth
Radio & Television Corp., 99 F. Supp. 701 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (rejecting claim that secondary market
investor was defrauded by corporation because of a lack of privity).
44. See SEC, REPORT OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL
CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (1976).
45. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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the books and records of a public company “accurately and fairly” describe
company transactions.46 It also mandates that public corporations have a system of
internal controls to help ensure the reliability of their financial statements.47 These
new requirements increased the expectation that periodic disclosure, including
quarterly reports, would be accurate. Decades later, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act built
upon this foundation to mandate the yearly assessment and certification of the
effectiveness of such internal controls.48
The quarterly reports that were filed on Form 10-Q became successful enough
in providing uniform disclosure to markets that by the early 1980s, the SEC found
it unnecessary to require established public companies to file extensive disclosures
when selling additional securities to the public.49 Instead of filing a full registration
statement for such a sale, a seasoned corporation could simply refer investors to its
periodic reports. Such information would have been incorporated into the stock
price by markets, making a new filing unnecessary.50 Without quarterly filings that
were expected to conform to a standard of accuracy, there would have been a
stronger case that investors would need an update of information that had been
filed as part of the company’s annual 10-K or its last registration statement. One
uniform rule, Regulation S-K,51 set forth requirements that made the information
disclosed in the 10-Q and 10-K equivalent to that disclosed in the initial registration
statement filed by a company going public.
As periodic disclosure became more uniform and reliable, investors were
better able to assess the performance of a company. A corporation’s current results
could be compared to prior results with some assurance that both were prepared
using the same methodology. A corporation’s financial reports could also be
evaluated relative to the reports of similar companies with greater confidence. The
market could efficiently process this information to assess a company’s value.
B. Quarterly Projections
By the late 1970s, quarterly disclosure was an established requirement for all
public companies and subject to basic standards of reliability. It took another decade
46. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(b)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
47. Id.
48. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
49. Instead, they could file an abbreviated registration statement that incorporates by reference
the company’s periodic reports. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release
No. 6383, Exchange Act Release No. 18524 (Mar. 3, 1982); Shelf Registration, Securities Act Release
No. 6499, Exchange Act Release No. 20384 (Nov. 17, 1983).
50. There were different opinions at the time as to whether Exchange Act filings were
sufficiently reliable. Compare Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and Shelf
Registration: An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984) (arguing that due diligence of quarterly
reports was unnecessary in an efficient market), with Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated
Disclosure, and Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1984) (arguing
that due diligence might be necessary).
51. Reg. S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.10–229.702.
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for the pressure to generate quarterly results to become systematic. It was not until
quarterly projections used to assess a company’s performance became widely
dispersed and utilized that companies began to feel the need to continually deliver
short-term results.
1. The Emergence of Quarterly Projections
Research analysts who closely follow and evaluate public companies are an
important part of what Professors Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman famously
called the mechanisms of market efficiency.52 As recognized by the SEC and the
U.S. Supreme Court,53 analysts are critical information processors that are essential
for stock markets to function efficiently. An important way that research analysts
influence a company’s stock price is by publishing earnings projections predicting a
company’s financial results.54
Starting in the 1960s, analysts increasingly began seeking information from
companies that would allow them to better forecast their earnings.55 Large
corporations had long generated their own internal budgets and projections to
manage their operations.56 Over time, it was not difficult for these forecasts to
migrate outside of the corporation’s walls.57 Even as the legality of insider trading
became more questionable, information relating to market forecasts was often

52. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
53. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1983).
54. While companies can also release their own earnings projections, a substantial percentage
of companies do not. See, e.g., Anne Beyer et al., The Financial Reporting Environment: Review of the
Recent Literature, 50 J. ACCT. & ECON. 296, 313 (2010) (reporting that the percentage of firms
providing public earnings forecasts increased from 10–15% in the mid-1990s to 50% in 2004).
55. Even before the rise of public companies, forecasting was an essential part of business. See,
e.g., PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 95 (1998) (noting
that “forecasting—long denigrated as a waste of time at best and a sin at worst—became an absolute
necessity in the course of the seventeenth century for adventuresome entrepreneurs who were willing
to take the risk of shaping the future according to their own design”).
56. As documented by the business historian Alfred D. Chandler, as early as 1906, the DuPont
company systematically prepared and used internal forecasts that were “checked regularly against actual
results.” ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 449 (1977). Companies like General Motors soon followed. ALFRED
D. CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISE 145–53 (2d prtg. 1963).
57. In a sense, internal projections are a part of what economists refer to as internal capital
markets. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Stein, Internal Capital Markets and the Competition for Corporate Resources,
52 J. FIN. 111 (1997) (assessing conditions when internal capital markets are efficient). When managers
are better monitors of projects than markets, it can be efficient for them to allocate funds to the most
promising projects within the firm, rather than going to external investors to fund those projects. See,
e.g., George G. Triantis, Organizations As Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms,
Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1105 (2004)
(“The distinction between external and internal capital markets is that capital moves between projects
by contract in the former case and by authority or fiat in the latter.”).
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selectively disclosed to analysts.58 More companies also began publicly disclosing
their own projections during this period.59
At a conference on public reporting of projections held at Northwestern
University in 1971, the CEO of the retailer J.C. Penney described how the company
came to issue projections. Prior to 1963, J.C. Penney’s business was relatively
simple, and it “furnished only the most basic historical information” to analysts.60
As it began to expand and diversify, the company found that “analysts were less
able to develop a satisfactory evaluation of Penney on the basis of the rather scanty
information which had satisfied them in the past.”61 J.C. Penney thus began
developing forecasts based on its internal budgets,62 which “include projections of
sales [and] earnings” that “were developed solely for management planning and
control purposes” but had become “desirable for external reporting purposes.”63
These initial projections were typically of a company’s yearly rather than
quarterly earnings. Starting in 1967, Standard & Poor’s began publishing a weekly
publication called the Earnings Forecaster that listed multiple analyst forecasts for
about a thousand public companies.64 For the typical company, the Earnings
Forecaster would report the actual earnings for the most recent year as well as
forecasts for the annual earnings for the next two years. By July 1970, the Earnings
Forecaster included in a separate section analyst decisions to revise prior projections
upwards or downwards.65
The emergence of projections coincided with and perhaps reflected a shift in
the way that markets valued companies. When the original federal securities laws
were passed, investors primarily focused on assessing the value of a company’s
assets. As Professor Paul Mahoney has shown, Congress in the 1930s was mainly
concerned with promoters who issued stock backed by assets that were assigned
arbitrarily high values.66 Moreover, a lack of uniformity in accounting principles

58. An article published in 1967 noted that while the SEC prohibited projections, “[c]ompany
officials, however, are often confronted with projections made by brokerage firms and investment
banking houses and asked to confirm the figures.” Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Corporate Disclosure/Insider
Trading, 45 HARV. BUS. REV. 129, 134 (1967).
59. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1199 (1970) (“The professionals get management projections informally through
press conferences, speeches to analysts’ societies or press releases, and these projections form the basis
for professional judgments.”); James M. Patell, Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price
Behavior: Empirical Tests, J. ACCT. RES. 246 (1976) (studying 336 voluntary forecasts issued by
companies through the Wall Street Journal from 1963 to 1967).
60. Kenneth S. Axelson, An Executive’s Views on the Forecasting of Earnings, in PUBLIC
REPORTING OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL FORECASTS, supra note 14, at 35, 35.
61. Id.
62. J.C. Penney began compiling systematic budgets in the early 1960s. See Isadore Barmash,
Penney-Pinching: Budget Process Detailed and Long, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1972, at F1.
63. Axelson, supra note 60, at 37.
64. See STANDARD & POOR’S, EARNINGS FORECASTER ( Jan. 6, 1967).
65. See STANDARD & POOR’S, EARNINGS FORECASTER ( July 3, 1970).
66. PAUL G. MAHONEY, WASTING A CRISIS: WHY SECURITIES REGULATION FAILS
46–48 (2015).
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until the 1970s made it difficult to rely upon earnings results that could serve as the
basis for forecasting future performance.67 Indeed, for decades, financial statements
were not meant to inform the decisions of investors.68
Over time, investors definitively recognized that the value of a company’s
equity is the present value of the company’s future earnings. As one commentator
observed with respect to the bull market of the late 1950s, which featured
electronics and high technology issues, investors were willing to price such
companies based “not on current earnings or past performance but on
projections.”69 A 1972 article in the Harvard Business Review noted the “appearance
of new security analysis models” and that “[s]hifting from balance-sheet-oriented
book and liquidation value approaches, investors have reached a nearly unanimous
perception that the value of the common stock—whether viewed in terms of
multiples of earnings or more sophisticated concepts—is the present worth of
future earnings available to the stock.”70
As sophisticated investors and analysts relied on such models to assess the
value of their investments,71 projections became more useful to them in predicting
a company’s future earnings. The increasing importance of projections in valuation
is illustrated by revisions to the classic Security Analysis text by Benjamin Graham
and David Dodd. Through its second edition, which was published in 1940, there
was no chapter on earnings projections, though there was a chapter on the
“Significance of the Earnings Record.”72 Beginning with the third edition published
in 1951, the title of that chapter was changed to include the phrase: “Projections of
Earnings and Dividends.”73 This chapter was then significantly expanded in the
fourth edition published in 1962.74
The increasing dissemination of projections by public companies was in
tension with the SEC’s negative views on the disclosure of forward-looking

67. See Ray Ball & Philip Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6
J. ACCT. RES. 159, 160 (1968) (observing that “[b]ecause accounting lacks an all-embracing theoretical
framework, dissimilarities in practice have evolved. As a consequence, net income is an aggregate of
components which are not homogenous. It is thus alleged to be a ‘meaningless’ figure, not unlike the
difference between twenty-seven tables and eight chairs.”).
68. See Jack L. Treynor, The Trouble with Earnings, 28 FIN. ANAL. J. 41, 41 (1972) (“Informing
the analyst was not always a primary or even a secondary objective of financial accounting, nor were
accounting outputs always the primary input for securit[ies] analysis . . . .”).
69. ROBERT SOBEL, N.Y.S.E.: A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE,
1935–1975, at 235 (1975).
70. See Henry B. Reiling & John C. Burton, Financial Statements: Signposts As Well As
Milestones, HARV. BUS. REV. 45, 46 (1972).
71. By the late 1960s, professional managers and research analysts had become influential in
setting securities prices. See WHEAT REPORT, supra note 32, at 10.
72. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUES 472 (2d ed. 1940).
73. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUES 412 (3d ed. 1951).
74. BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS: PRINCIPLES AND
TECHNIQUES 450 (4th ed. 1962).
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information. Though it did not have a formal ban on projections, the SEC had a
longstanding policy of prohibiting companies from including projections in official
SEC filings.75 This policy was based on the assumption that “attempts by companies
to predict future earnings on their own or on the authority of experts have almost
invariably been held by the Commission to be misleading because they suggest to
the investor a competence and authority which does not in fact exist.”76 The SEC’s
position was consistent with its philosophy of protecting investors from fraudulent
schemes that often relied on promises of future performance with little hope of
success, but this stance began to look anachronistic as analysts and sophisticated
investors commonly used valuation models that relied on projections of future
earnings.77 Such predictions also may have seemed safer for established public
companies trading in active markets than for new companies without an
operating history.
Even prior to the SEC’s mandate of quarterly disclosure, markets started to
harshly judge some companies for failing to meet market expectations. For example,
in the late 1960s, when Litton Industries, a prominent conglomerate, announced
that its quarterly earnings would be lower than the prior year’s earnings, there was
a significant negative market reaction that was widely noted.78 Such large public
companies were believed to continually deliver increasing earnings, partly because
of the prowess of their management and clever diversification of holdings, and the
failure to do so “was taken by investors to mean that Litton—the very symbol of
all that is modern in management—was indeed subject to seriously
inadequate management.”79
While initially the norm was for analysts to issue forecasts of annual earnings,
eventually it became common for analysts to issue projections of quarterly results.80
75. As Harvard Law School Professor Victor Brudney explained, “[t]he Commission’s
opposition was expressed in admonitory releases and in opinions in particular cases more than in any
general prohibitory regulation under the Securities Act.” Victor Brudney, A Note on Materiality and
Soft Information Under the Federal Securities Laws, 75 VA. L. REV. 723, 753, n.80 (1989).
76. Harry Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 BUS. LAW. 300,
307 (1961); see also Patell, supra note 59 (describing debate about the usefulness of forecasts).
77. By 1969, the Wheat Report concluded that research analysts “are in the business of
estimating the present and future value of securities based on predictions of sales and earnings.” The
Report thus concluded that “most investment decisions are based essentially on estimates of future
earnings.” WHEAT REPORT, supra note 32, at 95.
78. See JOHN BROOKS, THE GO-GO YEARS: THE DRAMA AND CRASHING FINALE OF WALL
STREET’S BULLISH 60S, at 181 (1999); William S. Rukeyser, Litton Down to Earth, FORTUNE, Apr. 1968,
at 139. Other companies in the 1960s suffered negative stock price reactions for failing to meet market
estimates. See, e.g., Fin. Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 515 (10th
Cir. 1973) (noting substantial decline in McDonnell Douglas stock after it reported semiannual earnings
significantly below estimates).
79. William S. Rukeyser, Litton Down to Earth, in THE CONGLOMERATE COMMOTION 109,
110 (1970).
80. Even for projections of yearly earnings, there was concern that forecasts would encourage
short-term trading. See, e.g., William S. Gray III, FAF Special Comm. on Corp. Forecasts, Proposals by
the Federation for Systematic Disclosure of Corporate Forecasts, in DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
FORECASTS TO THE INVESTOR 1, 70 (Financial Analysts Federation, ed. 1973) (“There is considerable
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The Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System, also known as I/B/E/S, began
compiling analyst quarterly projections that were available through a computer
database starting in 1984.81 By the late 1980s, a magazine profile of a research
analyst noted that her “constant task is to predict per-share profits in three-month
increments.”82 Even as quarterly projections became more prevalent, one journalist
reported that at the mutual fund giant Fidelity there was not much emphasis on
companies meeting specific projections through the late 1980s.83 During that
period, he never heard an analyst note that a company “exceeded expectations” or
ask whether a company would “make the quarter.”84
As financial data companies began to more systematically compile and
disseminate consensus earnings projections in the early 1990s,85 they became an
easy heuristic that could be used for assessing a public company’s performance.86
There is evidence that by the mid-1990s, investors began to reward companies for
meeting quarterly earnings projections.87 As projections became more important,
companies had a greater incentive to meet them. One study found that the

fear among investors that more frequent management forecasts would tend to induce more emphasis
on short term trading.”); Prem Prakash & Alfred Rappaport, Synthesis of Discussion Public Reporting of
Corporate Financial Forecasts: Some Perspectives, in PUBLIC REPORTING OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL
FORECASTS, supra note 14, at 189, 191 (noting risk that “[t]he presentation of a one-year earnings
forecast would give impetus to short-term market trading in place of investment with an eye toward
longer term prospects.”).
81. See, e.g., Douglas J. Skinner & Richard G. Sloan, Earnings Surprises, Growth Expectations,
and Stock Returns or Don’t Let an Earnings Torpedo Sink Your Portfolio, 7 REV. ACCT. STUD. 289, 294
(2002) (using I/B/E/S quarterly data starting in 1984). This service started compiling forecasts in 1972.
See Samuel S. Stewart, Jr., Research Report on Corporate Forecasts, in DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE
FORECASTS TO THE INVESTOR, supra note 80, at 75, 126.
82. Joseph Nocera, Picking the Winners, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 20, 1987, at 26, 30; see also
Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 21, 26 (1988) (noting
“major . . . pressure on corporations to generate high current earnings on a quarter-to-quarter basis.”).
83. Joseph Nocera, The Trouble with the Consensus Estimate, MONEY, June 1998, at 59, 59–60.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., id. (describing how the company First Call began disseminating projections
electronically in 1990); see also ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER: HOW THE DRIVE FOR QUARTERLY
EARNINGS CORRUPTED WALL STREET AND CORPORATE AMERICA 167 (2003) (finding that Wall
Street Journal articles mentioning the words “consensus” and “estimates” and “earnings” tripled
between 1989 and 1994 and increased tenfold from 1994 to 1999).
86. Meeting a projection is only one of a number of potential thresholds that the market can
look to in assessing performance. One study describes three such thresholds: (1) sustaining recent
performance; (2) meeting analyst forecasts; and (3) reporting profits. Of these three, there is evidence
that the third threshold is most important. See Francois Degeorge et al., Earnings Management to Exceed
Thresholds, 72 J. BUS. 1 (1999).
87. Professors Brown and Caylor documented the impact of quarterly earnings reports issued
from 1984 to 2002. They concluded that “since the mid-1990s, but not before then, investors
unambiguously reward[ed] . . . firms . . . for reporting quarterly earnings meet[ing] . . . analysts’ estimates
. . . .” Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, A Temporal Analysis of Quarterly Earnings
Thresholds: Propensities and Valuation Consequences, 80 ACCT. REV. 423, 425 (2005).
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probability of a company meeting a quarterly projection increased from 40% in 1985
to 70% in 1997.88
2. The SEC’s Support of Projections
The influence of the securities laws on projections of company earnings is not
immediately apparent. As noted earlier, quarterly projections originated in market
practices rather than government regulation. Even though it no longer prohibits
earnings projections in its filings, the SEC has never required public companies to
issue them. Yet SEC policy has often supported the current system that emphasizes
meeting such projections.
By the late 1970s, partly because of the reality that projections were already
being widely used, the SEC reversed its policy of discouraging company projections
upon the recommendation of an Advisory Committee on Disclosure.89 A
significant motivation for the new policy was to provide public investors with access
to projections that companies released privately to analysts and select investors.90
Another rationale was that as companies became more sophisticated in developing
internal budgets, there was greater confidence that forecasts would be reliable.91
The SEC not only reversed its prohibition, it actively sought to encourage
companies to issue forward-looking statements.92 In the late 1970s, it passed a safe
harbor rule that provided some protection for companies issuing written projections
from securities fraud liability.93 This safe harbor was meant to address the concern
of companies that they would be sued by investors suffering losses if they issued a
projection and failed to meet it.
This initial safe harbor was unsuccessful because it only provided protection
for projections made in good faith and with a reasonable basis. It also only applied
to official projections contained in SEC filings. As companies increasingly issued
projections, private class action litigants routinely sued companies experiencing a
88. Dawn A. Matsumoto, Management’s Incentives to Avoid Negative Earnings Surprises, 77
ACCT. REV. 483, 488 (2002).
89. See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE TO THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION D-14 (Nov. 3, 1977). It is worth noting that both Warren
Buffett and Martin Lipton, who in the present day have proposed reform of the current system, were
members of that committee. See Benoit, supra note 3; Dimon & Buffett, supra note 3.
90. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The SEC’s Unfinished Soft Information Revolution, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1953, 1956 (1995) (noting argument that “by prohibiting disclosure of earnings projections, [the
SEC] had perpetuated a form of differential disclosure”).
91. See John C. Burton, Forecasts: A Changing View From the Securities and Exchange
Commission, in PUBLIC REPORTING OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL FORECASTS, supra note 14, at 81,
84–85 (noting that corporate budgeting was not as developed when SEC initially prohibited projections
but since then “a whole generation of managers has grown accustomed to the use of a budget as a
major tool of management control”).
92. See Guides for Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, Securities Act
Release No. 5992, Exchange Act Release No. 15305 (Nov. 7, 1978) (“[E]ncourag[ing] companies to
disclose management projections . . . whether or not included in Commission filings.”).
93. Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release No. 6084 ( June 25, 1979) (adopting
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.175(c), 240.3b-6).
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significant stock price decline after failing to meet a quarterly projection and argued
that those projections did not have a reasonable basis.94 One study reported that
from January 1990 through December 1993, forty percent of securities litigation
cases alleged that the defendant failed to meet a projection.95 Companies thus
claimed that there was too much risk for them to publicly issue projections.96
Such private litigation undermined the SEC’s policy of encouraging companies
to disclose projections and created the perception that securities class actions taxed
innovation. Though it often has viewed private securities litigation as supplementing
its mission of investor protection, the SEC supported the passage of federal
legislation to limit litigation challenging the failure to meet a projection. Partly
because of the SEC’s support, in 1995, Congress passed the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA),97 which contained a broad safe harbor that applied
not only to projections in SEC filings, but to projections issued through less formal
avenues such as a speech or press release.98 It raised the standard of liability
significantly, requiring knowledge that the projection was false to be liable under
Rule 10b-5. Even when a projection is knowingly false, if it is paired with meaningful
cautionary language, the projection will not be the basis for Rule 10b-5 liability.99
C. The Modern Quarterly Reporting System
By the late 1990s, the quarterly reporting system undeniably had a significant
influence on the behavior of public companies. In a famous 1998 speech, SEC
Chairman Arthur Levitt highlighted the existence of what he called a Numbers Game,
where companies would misstate their earnings by small amounts to meet their
earnings projections.100 In doing so, they were attempting to avoid a negative market
reaction for missing a forecast. By this point, quarterly projections had generated
enough pressure so that many companies felt compelled to cheat to create the
appearance of meeting them.
The SEC understandably viewed this problem through the lens of investor
protection. The issue to it was that companies were misleading investors by creating
the appearance that they were meeting projections. The simple solution was to make
disclosure more accurate. The SEC did not seriously consider the possibility that
94. Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 7101, 57 SEC
Docket 1999, at 16 (Oct. 13, 1994).
95. See James D. Beck & Sanjai Bhagat, Shareholder Litigation: Share Price Movements, News
Releases, and Settlement Amounts, 18 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 563 (1997).
96. J. Carter Bebse, Jr., Now It’s SEC vs. the Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1994, at A16.
97. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2010)).
98. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (2012).
99. There is evidence that more companies began issuing forward-looking statements after the
passage of the safe harbor. See Marilyn F. Johnson, et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on
the Disclosure of Forward-Looking Information by High Technology Firms, 39 J. ACCT. RES. 297 (2001).
100. Arthur
Levitt,
Chairman,
SEC,
Remarks
at
NYU
Center
for
Law and Business: The “Numbers Game” (Sept. 28, 1998) (transcript available at https:/
/www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt [ https://perma.cc/C9YW-VNDN ]).
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the need to meet quarterly forecasts was a problematic source of pressure on
public companies.
As a result, the SEC doubled down on the quarterly reporting system. It took
the position that companies must be extremely precise in reporting quarterly results
to investors. For years before, auditors operated under the assumption that some
accounting issues had only a small impact on a company’s results and should not be
important to investors.101 They applied a bright-line rule where an earnings error
would not be material to investors if it affected less than five percent of the
company’s earnings.102 Some companies abused this rule to justify accounting
decisions that were objectively wrong to meet their quarterly projections.103 Soon
after Levitt’s Numbers Game speech, the SEC began requiring auditors to apply a
vague, multi-factor test in assessing the materiality of a potential misstatement. Even
a small error can be material if it “hides a failure to meet analysts’ consensus
expectations” or was motivated to “‘manage’ reported earnings.”104
In addition to addressing the accuracy of quarterly reports, the SEC attempted
to reform the process by which companies disseminated information about whether
they would meet market expectations. Selective disclosure not only allowed analysts
to develop accurate forecasts, it permitted favored investors to learn whether a
company would meet or miss a projection. The SEC attempted to level the playing
field through Regulation FD,105 which requires full disclosure of material
information a company conveys to analysts. In doing so, the SEC made it more
difficult for companies to shape quarterly projections through backdoor channels.
Quarterly disclosure became even more burdensome after the spectacular
collapse of Enron and WorldCom. Both companies committed accounting fraud to
meet quarterly projections. Like the SEC, Congress viewed this as an investor
protection issue that could be addressed by improving the accuracy of public
company internal controls. The resulting statute, Sarbanes-Oxley, requires public
companies to devote significant resources to ensure the integrity of their
periodic reports.
Viewed solely through the lens of investor protection, efforts to increase the
accuracy of quarterly disclosure are desirable. However, when the issue is broadened
to consider the issue of short-termism, these efforts arguably reinforce what might
be a flawed system. Modern SEC policy has mainly focused on issues relating to

101. See Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks Before the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants (Dec. 5, 2005) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/
spch120505psa.htm [ https://perma.cc/B85N-MLDV ]) (criticizing SAB-99).
102. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17 CFR Part 211 (Aug. 1999) (describing a “rule of
thumb” where “the misstatement or omission of an item that falls under a 5% threshold is not material
in the absence of particularly egregious circumstances . . . .”).
103. See James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513,
524–26 (2009).
104. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, supra note 102.
105. 17 C.F.R. § 243 (2019).
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disclosure regulation without extensively considering the possibility that quarterly
projections should be regulated.
II. THE QUARTERLY REPORTING SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERMISM
The emergence of the modern quarterly reporting system in the 1970s
coincided with a broader shift in theories of corporate purpose.106 The
understanding that managers could consider the interests of corporate stakeholders
gave way to shareholder primacy, where managers are expected to maximize
shareholder wealth. As disclosure became more uniform and reliable, and
projections became the accepted way of judging company performance, public
companies were increasingly expected to deliver short-term results. Other
developments such as changes in executive compensation packages and the rise of
activist investors have also affected managerial incentives, but the quarterly
reporting system has been especially influential because it fundamentally requires
public companies to manage their short-term performance. Moreover, the quarterly
reporting system has influenced investors, many of whom base their trading
strategies on predicting whether a company meets its quarterly projections. While
the quarterly reporting system is not the only cause of short-termism, and its precise
impact on corporate behavior is unclear, it is an important contributor.
A. Corporations
Compared to the scrutiny of hedge fund activism, the quarterly reporting
system does not create intense pressure on corporations to take drastic measures.
While it is not as powerful as a proxy battle, quarterly reporting covers a much
broader range of public companies than the few that are subject to a major
shareholder campaign.107 While the evidence is unclear with respect to whether the
frequency of disclosure significantly contributes to short-termism, there is a case
that the pressure of meeting projections can result in a short-term emphasis by
corporations that in certain circumstances results in the destruction of
long-term value.
1. Quarterly Disclosure
When companies are required to disclose more frequently, they must take care
to generate strong results for more periods than when they disclose less frequently.

106. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING
SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 18–19 (2012)
(tracing origins of shareholder primacy to the 1970s).
107. A recent report found that from 2014 to 2018, an average of 272 companies each year
were subject to a public activist campaign. Only 56 of these interventions involved a proxy context. See
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 2018 SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 26 (2019),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-SandC-MnA-2018-US-ShareholderActivism-Analysis.pdf [ https://perma.cc/D8EH-2WSE ]. Moreover, not all such campaigns request
corporate action to boost short-term returns. See id. at 27.
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With annual disclosure, a company need only show once a year that its earnings
have grown, or at least remained stable, relative to the prior period. With quarterly
disclosure, markets will make such a determination four times a year.
Managers will thus have an incentive to make decisions that will show that
their performance is improving for each quarter. Their strategy will differ relative to
when they only need to show improvement on a yearly or semiannual basis. Some
economists have thus theorized that more frequent disclosure creates an incentive
to choose projects that generate results immediately rather than over time.108 If such
projects create less value than the ones that would have been chosen if the company
was subject to less frequent disclosure, a quarterly disclosure mandate could reduce
firm value.109
But quarterly disclosure requirements will only substantially affect firm
decision-making if markets find it difficult to assess the value of firm projects. In
an efficient market, a company’s stock price should not be seriously affected by
short-term fluctuations in company performance.110 When markets are unable to
adequately evaluate a project, managers can persuade investors of the project’s
worth by sending credible signals that it is succeeding.111 As businesses have grown
larger and more complex, it has become especially difficult for investors to assess
them.112 Investors, like all individuals, find it useful to rely on simple heuristics to
simplify complexity.113

108. Frank Gigler et al., How Frequent Financial Reporting Can Cause Managerial
Short-Termism: An Analysis of the Costs and Benefits of Increasing Reporting Frequency, 52
J. ACCT. RES. 357 (2014) (noting that more frequent disclosure increases the risk of short-termism but
also deters investment in value-destroying projects).
109. Moreover, quarterly disclosure can be a tax on management time. See, e.g., Lawrence
H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case For a
Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 163, 173 (1989) (“It is not uncommon for the chief
executive officers of major U.S. corporations to spend a week or more each quarter telling their
corporate story to security analysts.”). However, such efforts will also create benefits for both issuers
and investors.
110. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 336–39 (1990) (arguing that efficient markets do not cause myopia by managers);
Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, 104
Q.J. ECON. 655, 655 (1989) (noting efficient markets argument that “since it is unlikely that the market
can be systematically fooled by inflated earnings, managers will only lower stock prices by undertaking
actions that are not in the best long-run interests of their companies”).
111. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 110, at 657; see also M.P. Narayanan, Managerial Incentives for
Short-Term Results, 40 J. FIN. 1469 (1985) (showing that managers have incentive to boost short-term
results because their competence is difficult to assess).
112. See, e.g., MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M. H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT
OF THE BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES 25–28 (2001) (describing difficulty of valuing
intangible assets); George S. Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in
Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602 (2017) (observing that materiality standard permits large
firms to limit disclosure); Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and
the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 329
(2003) (noting inability of markets to adequately analyze and interpret information concerning Enron).
113. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124 (1974) (observing that “people rely on a limited number of heuristic
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The ability of corporate managers to continually improve performance on a
quarterly basis provides assurance to investors that a project is creating value. There
is significant evidence that markets prefer smooth rather than choppy earnings.114
As market valuations are increasingly based on speculative projections of future
performance, the ability of management to continually deliver quarterly results
provides assurance that such performance will continue. While managers could
demonstrate such competence on a yearly basis, strong quarterly results can provide
investors with additional confidence that a high market capitalization is warranted.
Companies may fear that if they do not deliver smooth earnings, they will be unfairly
punished by the market and face an intervention from an activist investor.115
Even if the quarterly reporting system creates an incentive to manage to the
short-term, the question is whether short-termism significantly impacts many
firms.116 Indeed, some public companies are essentially unaffected by the quarterly
reporting system. A company may be so successful that it easily delivers quarter
after quarter of consistent earnings growth.117 Other companies combine a
compelling long-term strategy with market dominance that convinces investors that
a lofty valuation is justified even without immediate profitability. The ability to opt
out of the quarterly reporting treadmill is not limited to dominant companies. Less
successful companies that are not followed by research analysts have little incentive
to manage quarterly results.
There is some empirical evidence on the question of whether the frequency of
reporting results in questionable short-term decisions such as lowering firm
investment.118 A study by Professors Kraft, Vashishtha, and Venkatachalam found
a decrease in fixed asset investments of between 1.5 to 1.9 percent by companies
that were required to increase the frequency of their disclosure from 1950 to

principles which reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler
judgmental operations”). For example, investors continue to rely on credit ratings despite their many
flaws. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, What’s (Still) Wrong with Credit Ratings?, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1407, 1424
(2017) (noting continued “mechanistic reliance” on credit ratings).
114. See, e.g., Degeorge et al., supra note 86, at 6–7 (finding that earnings thresholds are
psychologically important to investors); Alfred Rappaport, The Economics of Short-Term Performance
Obsession, 61 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65, 65 (2005) (“Sizable stock price responses to earnings surprises
suggest that short-term earnings, not long-term cash flow prospects, fuel price changes.”).
115. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, The Short-Term/Long-Term Dichotomy and Investment
Theory: Implications for Securities Market Regulation and for Corporate Law, 70 N.C. L. REV. 137, 142
(1991) (noting that “[t]he obsession many managers currently have with near-term earnings results
partly from a perceived vulnerability to takeover resulting from the tendency of financial markets to
‘discount’ stocks”); Schwartz, supra note 7 (arguing that hedge funds use disclosure to
pressure companies).
116. Even those skeptical of the impact of short-termism acknowledge that it likely affects some
firms. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 11, at 100.
117. Even companies that are consistently profitable can be pressured by projections if they do
not deliver an increase as great as predicted.
118. There is also evidence that simply going public subjects companies to pressure that reduces
investment relative to private companies. See John Asker et al., Corporate Investment and Stock Market
Listing: A Puzzle?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342 (2015).
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1970.119 They compared firms that were newly subject to requirements to increase
disclosure with firms whose reporting requirements remained constant. One
important limitation of the study is that because of a lack of data during this period
it did not measure whether R&D spending declined. Another question is whether
markets during this period were comparable to markets today. The cost of trading
was higher prior to 1975, meaning that markets would have been less efficient in
responding to obvious and significant cuts in investment.
Two studies examined the experience of the European Union, which
mandated limited quarterly disclosure in 2004 only to repeal the mandate in 2013.120
A paper by Professors Pozen, Nallareddy, and Rajgopal found no significant change
in investment by companies in the UK that were forced to issue quarterly disclosure
after the EU mandate relative to UK companies that had voluntarily disclosed on a
quarterly basis before the EU mandate.121 However, because the UK did not require
that financial results be included in company quarterly disclosure,122 the policy did
not create uniform incentives to demonstrate improved financial performance.123
The second study, by Professors Ernstberger, Link, Stich, and Vogler, found
an increase in real asset management by EU firms newly subject to a mandate of
quarterly disclosure relative to firms that had been subject to a disclosure
requirement before the EU mandate.124 They defined real asset management in
terms of overproduction and reduction of discretionary expenses. However, they
did not look at whether company investment levels declined.125 Moreover, the
authors conceded that the “effects [they found] are considerably less pronounced
that the effects documented [by other studies] for other events.”126
While there is a theoretical case that more frequent periodic disclosure affects
manager incentives, the empirical evidence does not definitively establish that

119. See Arthur G. Kraft et al., Frequent Financial Reporting and Managerial Myopia, 93
ACCT. REV. 249, 260 61 (2018).
120. Currently, the EU only requires semiannual reporting. See Council Directive 2013/50, 2013
O.J. (L 294) 13 (EC). On the other hand, unlike the U.S., the EU also mandates continuous disclosure,
requiring the immediate release of material information to investors. Council Regulation 596/2014,
art. 17(1), 2014 O.J. (L 173) 34. It is thus not entirely clear whether the EU experience with quarterly
disclosure would be informative with respect to U.S. quarterly disclosure.
121. See Robert Pozen et al., Impact of Reporting Frequency on UK Public Companies, CFA
INSTIT. RES. FOUND. BRIEFS 6 (2017).
122. Moreover, there is less pressure from research analysts in the UK than in the U.S. See, e.g.,
KAY, supra note 13, at 64 (observing that the “dysfunctional process of earnings management and
earnings guidance has not yet reached the scale achieved in the US”).
123. After this quarterly mandate was lifted, a majority of companies continued voluntarily
issuing quarterly disclosures. See Owen Walker, The Long and Short of the Quarterly Reports Controversy,
FIN. TIMES ( July 1, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e61046bc-7a2e-11e8-8e67-1e1a0846c475
[https://perma.cc/8KJ3-G8VF].
124. See Jurgen Ernstberger et al., The Real Effects of Mandatory Quarterly Reporting, 92
ACCT. REV. 33, 51 54 (2017).
125. See, e.g., Kraft et al., supra note 119, at 251.
126. Ernstberger et al., supra note 124, at 56.
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increasing the frequency of disclosure significantly impacts firm behavior.127
Because changes in disclosure requirements occur infrequently, it is difficult to test
the hypothesis that increasing the number of periodic filings significantly increases
short-termism.
2. Quarterly Projections
At the very least, quarterly projections amplify the tendency of quarterly
disclosure to incentivize short-termism. While managers would have an incentive to
increase earnings even if they did not need to meet analyst forecasts, a projection
puts a precise number on what the market is expecting. Such precision reflects
extensive models of future earnings that become unraveled when the failure to meet
a quarterly projection requires rethinking a stream of predicted earnings.
There is also a case that projections are the primary driver of short-termism.
Even if the frequency of quarterly disclosure was reduced, if a semiannual or annual
report is evaluated in relation to a projection, there will be pressure to meet
that projection.
There is substantial evidence that projections affect managerial
decision-making. An often-cited survey of Chief Financial Officers in 2005 found
that “80% of survey participants report that they would decrease discretionary
spending on R&D, advertising, and maintenance to meet an earnings target.”128
Moreover, “[m]ore than half (55.3%) state that they would delay starting a new
project to meet an earnings target, even if such a delay entailed a small sacrifice in
value.”129 Because “[p]redictability of earnings is an over-arching concern among
CFOs . . . 78% of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in
exchange for smooth earnings.”130
Even if many public companies make questionable decisions to meet
projections, the question is whether the manipulations are significant. The 2005
study does not document the size of the hypothetical manipulations and only
established a willingness to delay a project for a “small sacrifice in value.” Markets

127. Even if there is a link between quarterly disclosure and reduced investment, there are other
causes for such trends that may be more significant. See, e.g., Robert C. Pozen & Mark Roe, Keep
Quarterly Reporting, CFO.COM (Aug. 27, 2018), http://ww2.cfo.com/regulation/2018/08/keepquarterly-reporting/ [ https://perma.cc/7V2L-VV9X] (“[I]t’s a mistake to blame quarterly stock
market reporting for reduced capital spending. Something else is operative—factors such as the
movement to capital-light, technology-oriented economies; the rise of Asian manufacturing; and the
weakness, until recently, of the economy overall.”).
128. John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting, 40
J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 32–35 (2005).
129. Id. at 5. Another concern is that the importance of meeting quarterly projections makes it
difficult for managers to consider the interests of stakeholders. Meeting quarterly projections can be
facilitated by cutting resources that might benefit workers or reduce the environmental impact of a
corporation’s policies.
130. Id.; see also Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Manipulation Through Real Activities
Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT. & ECON. 335, 336 (2006) (finding evidence that managers manipulate
financial results to avoid annual losses).
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would react to a decision that obviously compromises long-term value. For
example, if a company made a large and obvious cut in R&D expenditures to meet
quarterly projections, its stock price should decline as the market realizes that it has
sacrificed its long-term growth.131 Even when manipulations are not as obvious, it
is difficult to indefinitely hide decisions that significantly reduce firm value. One
study shows that over time, companies that meet projections with low quality
earnings will underperform the market.132
Projections are most likely to induce inefficient behavior if they are
unrealistically high. Professor Michael Jensen argues that irrationally high equity
valuations create agency costs as managers strive to meet impossible expectations.133
In doing so, they may engage in reckless behavior that destroys confidence in the
company if discovered. Initially manipulations to meet an unrealistic projection may
be small and motivated by genuine optimism that future performance will
improve.134 However, every manipulation makes it more difficult to meet
projections in the future.135 Managers may then commit fraud to delay revealing
earlier manipulations. If the earnings shortfall becomes too large to hide and comes
to light, the company’s stock price will collapse. Starting towards the end of the
1990s, many of the most notorious securities frauds such as Enron and WorldCom
were driven by the desire to convey the impression that a company was consistently
meeting its quarterly projections.136

131. On the other hand, there is evidence that short-term pressure can result in reduced R&D
expenditures. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge
Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 574–77 (2016) (summarizing studies).
132. See, e.g., Sanjeev Bhojraj et al., Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That
Marginally Miss or Beat Analyst Forecasts, 64 J. FIN. 2361, 2363–64 (2009) (finding for period from
1988 to 2006 that firms that meet projections with low quality earnings underperform the market over
the long-run).
133. Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 8–10 (2005)
(describing pressures of high equity valuations on management).
134. See, e.g., DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, SELLING HOPE, SELLING RISK: CORPORATIONS,
WALL STREET, AND THE DILEMMAS OF INVESTOR PROTECTION 35–37 (2016) (describing “slippery
slope fraud”); Baruch Lev, Corporate Earnings: Facts and Fiction, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 27, 36 (2003)
(observing that “the more common reason for earnings manipulation is that managers, forever the
optimists, are trying to ‘weather out the storm’—that is, to continue operations with adequate funding
and customer/supplier support until better times come”).
135. In addition to creating an incentive for fraud, the pressure to meet expectations can cause
inefficient behavior. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 133, at 10 (“To appear to be satisfying growth
expectations you use your overvalued equity to make long run value destroying acquisitions; you use
your access to cheap debt and equity capital to engage in excessive internal spending and risky negative
net present value investments that the market thinks will generate value . . . .”).
136. Second Amended Complaint ¶ 15, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Lay, Civ. No. H-04-0284
(S.D. Tex. July 8, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18776.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/74GE-U63H ] (noting that motivation of fraud was to “meet or exceed the published
expectations of industry analysts forecasting Enron’s reported earnings-per-share and other results”);
First Amended Complaint ¶ 3, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. WorldCom, Inc.,
Civ. No. 02-CV-4963
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 2002),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/
comp17829.htm [https://perma.cc/3Y3X-LQ8X ] (alleging that “WorldCom’s fraudulent accounting
practices . . . were designed to and did falsely and fraudulently inflate its income to correspond with
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However, it is unclear whether companies frequently face unrealistic
projections. Managers are not helpless in the face of market judgments. Companies
can manage expectations so that they are more realistic. Some do so actively and
openly, issuing their own projections and guidance to analysts to avoid surprise
earnings shortfalls.137 Others do so more quietly, discreetly leaking information in
private meetings with analysts who incorporate such information into their reports
and forecasts. Managers can moderate expectations so that they can be met
or exceeded.138
Some companies, though, do not wish to correct unrealistic projections, or do
not have the good judgment to do so. They may fuel optimism that results in an
unrealistically high value for their stock because they are influenced by their
corporate culture or have individual incentive to boost the company’s stock price.139
Past success can result in a treadmill where it becomes more difficult to meet
increasing market expectations.140 Managers may fear the consequences of issuing
more realistic earnings forecasts.
***

estimates by Wall Street analysts and to support the price of WorldCom’s common stock in the
market.”); Complaint ¶ 2, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Xerox Corp., Civ. No. 02-272789 (DLC)
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/complr17465.htm [ https://
perma.cc/FU8J-N32W ] (noting that accounting fraud “allowed Xerox to meet or exceed Wall Street
expectations in virtually every reporting period from 1997 through 1999”).
137. Studies during the mid-1990s found that only a minority of companies voluntarily issued
information to preempt a significant earnings miss. See, e.g., Ron Kasznik & Baruch Lev, To Warn or
Not to Warn: Management Disclosures in the Face of an Earnings Surprise, 70 ACCT. REV. 113, 114
(1995); Douglas J. Skinner, Why Firms Voluntarily Disclose Bad News, 32 J. ACCT. RES. 38, 40 (1994).
A study by the consulting firm McKinsey found no economic benefit for companies that provide their
own guidance to the market. See Peggy Hsieh et al., The Misguided Practice of Earnings Guidance, 19
MCKINSEY ON FIN. 1, 1 (2006).
138. There is evidence that companies with results exceeding market projections can earn
abnormal positive returns. See, e.g., Eli Bartov et al., The Rewards to Meeting or Beating Earnings
Expectations, 33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 173, 175 (2002). During the late 1990s, the journalist Michael Lewis
reported that “Wall Street analysts have low-balled their earnings estimates so that their corporate
customers could announce to the press that they had ‘beaten’ those estimates.” Michael Lewis, In
Defense of the Boom, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Oct. 27, 2002, at 44. More recently, even with the passage of
Regulation FD, companies privately urge analysts to lower their estimates. See Thomas Gryta
et al., Analysts Steered to “Surprises”—Companies’ Nudges and Phone Calls Lead to Lower Estimates That
Are Easier to Beat, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2016, at A1.
139. See, e.g., Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to
the Earnings Game, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41, 42 (2002) (“As stock options became an increasing
part of executive compensation, and managers who made great fortunes on options became the stuff
of legends . . . management teams proved reluctant to undermine their own stature by surrendering
hard-won records of quarter-over-quarter earnings growth.”); Donald C. Langevoort, Organized
Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other
Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 108 (1997) (“[C]orporate cultural biases, particularly optimistic
ones, can be adaptive mechanisms for encouraging trust and cooperation, and for deflecting the
selfishness-inducing-last-period problem that arises in times of stress and threat.”).
140. See, e.g., TIM KOLLER ET AL., VALUATION: MEASURING AND MANAGING THE VALUE OF
COMPANIES 51–52 (6th ed. 2015) (describing expectations treadmill).
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There is a case that the quarterly reporting system creates incentives for
managers to generate short-term results. However, the extent and impact of any
effect is difficult to measure. It is unclear that the frequency of disclosure is a
significant factor. There is a stronger argument that pressure from unrealistic
earnings projections can result in the significant destruction of long-term value.
B. Investors
The quarterly reporting system not only affects the behavior of corporations,
it influences the strategies of investors. Rather than working to assess the
fundamental value of a stock, short-term traders have an incentive to focus on
predicting whether a company will meet its earnings projections for the quarter.141
With more frequent earnings releases, there are more opportunities to trade on
earnings. Such trading amplifies the market reaction to such results, making them
more significant and increasing the incentive for public companies to manage their
short-term results.
Scholars who study stock markets often distinguish between noise traders and
information traders.142 A noise trader buys and sells stock without considering
information that relates to its fundamental value. He might buy a stock because he
sees patterns in the price movements suggesting that the price will rise, or simply by
guessing. An information trader buys and sells stock based on his assessment of
information relating to the corporation that has issued the stock. Information
traders may execute a value strategy, where they seek to identify when the market
price of the stock does not reflect its true value.
Quarterly results will draw the attention of both types of traders. A noise trader
may sell when a corporation misses its earnings projection, not because he believes
the company is worth less as a result, but because he anticipates that other traders
will sell. An information trader will invest time in gathering information to predict
whether the company is likely or unlikely to meet its projections. Perhaps he might
make visits to stores towards the end of a quarter to see if there are long lines. The
release of quarterly results will provide verification about whether the information
trader’s assessment is correct.
In addition to legitimate efforts to predict quarterly results, some investors will
attempt to simply obtain the answer in advance. The Second Circuit’s 2014 decision
in United States v. Newman described a culture where companies leaked advance
copies of quarterly reports to hedge funds.143 Research “analysts routinely solicited
information from companies in order to check assumptions in their models in

141. See, e.g., Rappaport, supra note 114 (“[F]inancial analysts fixate on quarterly earnings at the
expense of fundamental research.”).
142. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation,
55 DUKE L.J. 711, 714–15 (2006).
143. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[I]nvestor relations
personnel routinely ‘leaked’ earnings data in advance of quarterly earnings.”).

First to Printer_Park (Do Not Delete)

1020

U.C. IRVINE LAW REVIEW

3/17/2020 7:31 AM

[Vol. 10:991

advance of earnings announcements.”144 These practices were seen as so common
by the Second Circuit that it found that a reasonable investor would not believe that
such information was disclosed improperly.145
There is an argument that speculative trading on short-term results is
essentially rent-seeking of little social value.146 Noise trading only shifts gains and
losses between traders who are making little effort to assess the stock’s true value.
Insider trading on periodic results undermines the integrity of mandatory disclosure
by generating private gains for those who have access to information that will
already be conveyed to the public.147
The strongest argument that trading around quarterly results has value is with
respect to information traders. By gathering information to predict short-term
performance, such traders may gain insights into the long-term performance of a
company. The question, though, is whether the effort of predicting quarterly results
generates meaningful information about a public company’s long-term prospects.
Assessing whether a corporation is meeting projections is arguably no more than a
heuristic for those investors who cannot meaningfully determine the
corporation’s value.148
In a world with less frequent periodic disclosure, there would be fewer
significant events around which trading would occur. If such trading is purely
rent-seeking, society overall would benefit from reducing it. On the other hand, if
trading on periodic disclosure conveys valuable information to the market,
eliminating quarterly disclosure would lessen the incentive to gather information on
a company throughout the year.
Perhaps the increasing shift to diversified investments suggests that
short-termism is not pervasive in today’s stock markets. Many investors have
defaulted to a passive strategy, where they buy and hold a broad portfolio for many
years. Their hope is that over time, such a strategy will outperform one that requires
analysis of the financial prospects of particular companies. Investors with long-term
horizons have less of an interest in quarterly disclosure. If passivity is increasing

144. Id.
145. Markets are said to develop “whisper numbers” that reflect a more accurate assessment of
the company’s results than public projections. See, e.g., ECCLES ET AL., supra note 3, at 83–89.
146. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3
J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 101, 102–03 (1989) (describing argument that speculative trading is essentially
rent-seeking); Merritt B. Fox et al., Informed Trading and Its Regulation, 43 J. CORP. L. 817, 853 (2018)
(concluding that short-term trading is unlikely to improve allocative efficiency).
147. James J. Park, Insider Trading and the Integrity of Mandatory Disclosure, 2018
WIS. L. REV. 1133, 1165.
148. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Corporate Short-Termism—In the Boardroom and in the Courtroom, 68
BUS. LAW. 977, 985 (2013) (“Because they cannot evaluate complex, long-term, technologically
sophisticated information well, they rely on simple signals to evaluate the value of the corporate stock
in their portfolio. Quarterly earnings results accordingly loom larger than they would otherwise, because
of their relative simplicity.”); see also Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance
Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803 (2008) (describing problems with relying on heuristics relating
to governance).
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despite the influence of the quarterly reporting system, it suggests that such
reporting has not been decisive in affecting the time-horizons of investors. As
experience shows that the gains from trading on quarterly results are elusive,
investors will be less likely to pursue such trading strategies.
The criticism of the quarterly reporting system might be linked to the
increasing clout of long-term shareholders.149 Such investors are not as concerned
about short-term fluctuations150 and might be worried that short-term trading
strategies are distorting the incentives of corporations.151 They might prefer a
market where managers have more leeway to execute strategies that increase value
over time. On the other hand, it is far from clear that it would be in the best interest
of long-term shareholders to promote policies that could shield managers from
market scrutiny. The question for long-term shareholders is whether they benefit
from the information gathering of traders who seek to predict earnings on a
quarterly basis.
In addition to affecting the behavior of managers, the quarterly reporting
system influences investors. The quarterly reporting system creates rent-seeking by
investors that amplifies corporate short-termism.
III. QUARTERLY REPORTING SYSTEM REFORMS
This Part evaluates potential reforms to the quarterly reporting system that
could address the problem of short-termism.152 Because quarterly disclosure is not
the only cause of short-termism, the SEC should consider addressing other
contributors such as reliability requirements and projections. This Part concludes
that modest reforms such as increasing disclosure relating to projections are more
promising than radical reforms such as reducing the frequency of
periodic disclosure.

149. See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 131, at 581 (noting conflict between diversified investors
and hedge funds).
150. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 580 (2006) (noting that “longer-term investors” are “less concerned with quarterly or
annual performance”).
151. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL FOR A MORE
RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 (2009) (“[T]he focus of
some short-term investors on quarterly earnings and other short-term metrics can harm the interests of
shareholders seeking long-term growth and sustainable earnings, if managers and boards pursue
strategies simply to satisfy those short-term investors.”) [hereinafter THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING
SHORT-TERMISM].
152. It does not consider reforms such as taxing securities transactions or reforming executive
compensation that fall outside the core of securities disclosure regulation. It also does not address
potential reforms to the timing of disclosure by investors of significant stakes in a public company,
which have been addressed extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Who Bleeds When the Wolves
Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance
System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1958–64 (2017).
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A. Changing the Frequency of Periodic Disclosure
If the frequency of periodic disclosure is a significant cause of short-termism,
requiring fewer reports might give public companies additional room to look
beyond the immediate future. The effect of such a policy change is difficult to
predict. Reducing the number of periodic filings could result in a new order where
public companies are not as subject to arbitrary judgments relating to quarterly
results. Or, it may not substantially change the pressure on managers to demonstrate
earnings growth.
Rather than require less disclosure, another possible way of addressing
short-termism would be to require public companies to increase their disclosure.
Continuous disclosure would reduce the market’s focus on arbitrary quarterly
benchmarks. The question is whether such continuous reporting would be
cost-effective and useful to investors.
Given the weak evidence that the frequency of periodic disclosure is the
primary cause of short-termism, radical change to the mandate of quarterly
disclosure is unwarranted at this time.
1. Reducing Periodic Disclosure
While it was initially dismissed as an unrealistic option for larger public
companies, the SEC has taken the proposal for a semiannual or annual disclosure
system seriously.153 Predicting the effects of such a policy requires a significant
amount of speculation. Understanding the relationship between quarterly disclosure
and quarterly projections provides an additional lens through which to assess
the proposal.
a. The Optimistic Scenario
Under an optimistic scenario, reducing mandatory periodic disclosure would
permit public companies to negotiate their own disclosure agreements with markets.
Investors would likely permit some companies to disclose less frequently. Those
companies would save on the costs of disclosure and be freed from demonstrating
that their business is improving on a quarterly basis. For such companies, investors
might focus less on their periodic financial results and would instead use other
measures to assess their performance.
The possibility that issuers would benefit from the ability to choose tailored
disclosure rules has been analyzed in articles by Professor Romano and Professors
Choi and Guzman.154 If issuers have more flexibility to choose their disclosure

153. See supra note 5.
154. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the
International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903 (1998); Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998). But see Merritt B. Fox,
Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85
VA. L. REV. 1335 (1999) (questioning benefits of reducing mandatory disclosure).
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regime, they will choose the regime that optimizes their value. Companies that are
content to grow slowly but steadily through implementation of a long-term strategy
could opt out of quarterly disclosure. Companies that seek to grow quickly through
a risky project that is difficult to monitor might prefer to issue quarterly reports that
give markets comfort about the progress of the project.
Even if issuers are not required to file quarterly disclosure, they will have the
incentive to voluntarily release public updates when there are significant
developments. Companies already issue interim reports even when they are not
required to, and they would not stop the practice simply because they are subject to
less mandatory disclosure. Rather than win the trust of markets by consistently
delivering quarterly results, public corporations would establish their credibility by
diligently keeping investors informed about important developments.
b. The Pessimistic Scenario
Under a pessimistic scenario, eliminating quarterly disclosure would lessen
transparency without materially addressing the problem of short-termism. Reducing
mandatory disclosure might not eliminate pressure from investors to demonstrate
financial performance and simply re-direct it to other avenues.
Even if public companies were not subject to a quarterly disclosure mandate,
they would be subject to projections. Analysts would still issue forecasts of
semiannual and annual results. Companies would still feel compelled to meet such
projections. Such tests would be even more consequential if they only occur once
or twice a year rather than every quarter.
A danger of reducing quarterly disclosure is that investors will not be able to
distinguish between those companies that do not need to report on a quarterly basis
from those that should be. If investors cannot meaningfully make such distinctions,
they might indiscriminately punish all companies that opt out of quarterly
disclosure. As a result, most companies would feel compelled to continue
such reporting.
Because less frequent periodic disclosure would not affect investor demand
for information, such a policy change might not do much to reduce managerial work
to generate disclosure for investors. Without a clear rule concerning when
significant disclosure should be released, managers will have to make judgments
about when markets need information. Investors would grade managers based on
whether they make the correct decision about when the market needs additional
disclosure. If markets are undervaluing or overvaluing the stock, should the
company correct the misperception, or wait until its annual report? How will
managers know if the stock is over or undervalued?
A discretionary disclosure system could reduce the transparency of the process
by which information is conveyed to the market. Rather than correct
misperceptions by publicly releasing quarterly results, companies might do so
privately. The advantage of sophisticated investors who meet frequently with
management would grow significantly. Companies could not provide precise
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information without running afoul of Regulation FD,155 but they might be willing
to provide hints about their recent performance that would give investors with
favored access an edge. The benefit of quarterly disclosure, that it essentially
equalizes the playing field every three months, would be compromised with less
frequent disclosure.156
Without quarterly disclosure, there would be pressure to increase mandatory
disclosure in other ways. Because of mandatory quarterly reports, seasoned
companies need not file an extensive registration statement when selling
securities.157 The SEC assumes that for such companies, markets are efficient and
reflect the information contained in prior disclosures. That assumption would no
longer hold if quarterly disclosure was not mandated, and there would be a case that
public companies should disclose extensive information whenever they
sell securities.
***
On balance, while there are benefits to reducing the frequency of quarterly
filings, there are significant risks. Because investors will continue to demand
information, the burdens of reporting may not be significantly reduced. Given the
lack of clear evidence that the frequency of disclosure in itself has a significant
impact on public company decision-making, the case for radical change is weak.
2.

Continuous Disclosure

If the problem with quarterly disclosure is that it results in an overemphasis
on periodic results, perhaps the SEC should consider moving away from periodic
disclosure. Rather than limiting disclosure to a quarterly, semiannual, or annual
basis, the SEC could mandate continuous disclosure. If issuers were required to
constantly release material information, markets would not place as much emphasis
on quarterly or even annual reports. Managers would thus not feel compelled to
alter their strategies to demonstrate performance for an arbitrary period.
But as I discussed in an earlier paper, there is good reason why mandatory
disclosure is periodic rather than continuous.158 If securities regulation reflects the
results of a hypothetical bargain between investors and issuers, periodic disclosure

155. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2019) (requiring public disclosure of material information
conveyed to specified parties).
156. An interesting proposal by Professors Haeberle and Henderson argues that a market for
information where investors could pay for early access to company information would produce the
optimal amount of disclosure. See Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, A New Market-Based
Approach to Securities Law, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1313, 1315–18 (2018). Such a system could supplement
periodic disclosure on an annual basis and provide more transparency than the current system where
such information is conveyed through informal interactions. A market for company disclosure would
be challenging to implement because it would be difficult for investors to determine how much to pay
for such information. Id. at 1372–74. Moreover, companies might prefer to influence markets more
subtly rather than make open pricing decisions about the market value of their disclosure.
157. See Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11380 (Mar. 16, 1982).
158. Park, supra note 147, at 1153–55.
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reflects the interests of those parties. Issuers will vigorously resist continuous
disclosure because of its substantial costs.159 Investors may not demand such
disclosure because they prefer that managers contextualize results rather than
release a stream of information that they may not understand.
Even if there is a case for continuous disclosure, it is unclear that the policy
goal of reducing short-termism is compelling enough to substantially increase the
costs of mandatory disclosure for public companies.
B. Reducing the Burdens of Quarterly Disclosure
At least some of the motivation for reforming quarterly disclosure is concern
about the growing cost of preparing financial statements. Even if it did not change
the frequency of disclosure, perhaps the SEC could reduce the burden of quarterly
filings by relaxing reliability requirements.160
Securities regulation mandates that companies assess the accuracy of their
quarterly disclosure. Unlike annual financial statements, quarterly financial
statements do not need to be audited. However, as noted earlier, the 10-Q must
conform to GAAP. Moreover, the company’s auditor must review it161 and has
obligations to inquire into items that may not comply with GAAP.162
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the company’s CEO and CFO to review the report
and certify it does not have material misrepresentations and fairly presents the
financial condition of the company.163 An inaccurate 10-Q could trigger liability for
securities fraud if a material misstatement was made with fraudulent intent.164
The most promising way of reducing the burden of the quarterly reporting
system would be to narrow the definition of materiality for financial

159. As noted earlier, the SEC has rejected continuous reporting because of its costs. See supra
note 37.
160. A related proposal would maintain quarterly reports but only require abbreviated filings
so that companies would only have to report select information such as a company’s revenue with fuller
reports on a semiannual basis. See, e.g., Pozen & Roe, supra note 127 (proposing streamlining quarterly
reports). Such a policy would result in some modest cost savings, but so long as companies were
obligated to verify the accuracy of quarterly numbers, the cost of such reporting would still
be significant.
161. 17 C.F.R. §§ 210.8–03, 210.10–01 (2019).
162. See, e.g., AS 4105.22: Reviews of Interim Financial Information, PUB. COMPANY
ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD (Dec. 15, 2017), https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/
AS4105.aspx [https://perma.cc/RK7D-4RZQ].
163. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a–14, 240.15d–14 (2019). The lack of a certification requirement
by individual officers initially distinguished 1934 reports from the registration statement, which long
had required such signatures. See Cohen, supra note 35, at 1361.
164. See, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 318–19 (2007).
Moreover, if a quarterly report is issued around the time the company sells securities, it is incorporated
by reference into the company’s registration statement. The registration statement is subject to a
stringent liability standard where any material misstatement could trigger liability under Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933, even if it is not made with fraudulent intent. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
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misstatements.165 As noted earlier, the qualitative approach to assessing the
importance of a financial misstatement has been controversial. Even a very small
error can be material enough to trigger liability if it permitted the company to meet
an earnings projection.166
A simple reform would be for the SEC to de-emphasize the consideration of
whether a misstatement allowed a company to meet a projection in determining
whether the misstatement is material. For companies that just meet a projection,
virtually any accounting error could be deemed material. Under this proposal, so
long as it is not intentional, a small misstatement would not in itself be material,
regardless of its effect on meeting market expectations. If quarterly disclosures were
understood to be reasonable estimates rather than precise measurements, investors
might focus less on whether quarterly results meet quarterly projections.167
Quarterly reports could be viewed as uncertain rough drafts that are likely to be
revised on an annual basis.
The danger of such a change is that it would give companies more leeway to
manipulate financial statements to create the impression that they are consistently
meeting quarterly benchmarks. Investors seeking updates generally assume that
official SEC filings are reasonably accurate. The market’s scrutiny of financial
results predated the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms, and simply reverting to past practices
would be unlikely to check short-termism. Experience has shown that companies
will abuse their discretion to mislead investors. Reducing the verification of
quarterly reports would undermine an aspect of the securities laws that seeks to
check some of the dangers of short-termism.
The argument to reduce the costs of disclosure relates more to the issue of
whether regulation has made public company status too burdensome than to the
problem of short-termism. If verification costs are high, some companies may
prefer to save those costs by remaining private. It is unclear, though, that the cost
of quarterly disclosure by itself is decisive in that decision. The bulk of such costs
would remain with respect to the company’s annual or semiannual filings.
C. Qualitative Disclosure
If short-termism is a problem, perhaps disclosure regulation could encourage
companies to better articulate their long-term plans to investors through qualitative
disclosure. If such long-term disclosure was more effective, investors might place
more importance on long-term strategies rather than short-term results. Relatedly,
disclosure could be re-conceptualized so that it allows investors to assess factors

165. See Park, supra note 103, at 550 (proposing that only persistent misstatements should be
considered material).
166. Id. at 530–31.
167. The improved reliability of financial reports has been said to increase investor reliance on
them. See, e.g., Ken Brown, Corporate Reform: The First Year: Wall Street Plays Numbers Game with
Earnings, Despite Reforms, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2003, at A1.
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other than quarterly profits. Such social disclosure reforms have gained some
support from investors and scholars.
1. Improving Long-term Disclosure
A few years ago, a prominent institutional investor argued that while public
companies should continue to report on a quarterly basis, they should do more to
articulate their long-term strategy to counteract the reliance on short-term
projections.168 The hope is that rather than reacting to a single number, investors
will have information that allows them to put such results in a broader context.
Over the years, the SEC has attempted to make disclosure more qualitative so
that it gives investors a richer picture of the company’s strategy. For decades, the
Management Discussion & Analysis (MD&A) section of SEC disclosure has had
the goal of encouraging companies to provide more context to their financial
results. This provision requires companies to “describe any trends or uncertainties
that have had or that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material favorable
or unfavorable impact on net sales or revenues or income.”169 The MD&A is
“intended to give the investor an opportunity to look at the company through the
eyes of management by providing both a short and long-term analysis of the
business of the company.”170
The question is whether companies convey unique and significant information
about their long-term prospects in such qualitative disclosure. There is some
evidence that the MD&A requirement increased the accuracy of stock prices,
implying that markets find such narrative disclosures to be meaningful.171 On the
other hand, SEC disclosure has long been criticized because it is long-winded and
does not clearly reveal useful information.172 SEC filings are written by attorneys
who tend to translate business information into language that is unlikely to trigger
litigation. Moreover, the vagueness of the mandate to describe “trends or
uncertainties” means that companies will differ with respect to the information that
they provide. Indeed, the SEC has instructed that the “MD&A requirements are

168. See Letter from Lawrence D. Fink, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, BlackRock, to S&P
500 Chief Executives (2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/2016-larryfink-ceo-letter [ https://perma.cc/36XW-9KJY ] (“[W]e do believe companies should still report
quarterly results—‘long-termism’ should not be a substitute for transparency—but CEOs should be
more focused in these reports on demonstrating progress against their strategic plans than a one-penny
deviation from their EPS targets or analyst consensus estimates.”); see also JACOBS, supra note 3, at 10
(arguing that “[l]ack of communication prevents investors from understanding management’s
long-term goals and objectives”); Steven A. Bank & George S. Georgiev, Securities Disclosure As
Soundbite: The Case of CEO Pay Ratios, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1197–98 (2019) (proposing narrative
discussion to replace pay ratio disclosure).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(3)(ii) (2019).
170. Caterpillar Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30532, 50 S.E.C. 903, 1992 WL 71907, at *6
(Mar. 31, 1992) [hereinafter Caterpillar Inc.].
171. See, e.g., Fox et al., supra note 12, at 368–81; Volkan Muslu et al., Forward-Looking MD&A
Disclosures and the Information Environment, 61 MGMT. SCI. 931, 945 (2015).
172. See, e.g., Donald H. Meiers, The MD&A Challenge, 201 J. ACCT. 59 (2006).
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intentionally flexible and general.”173 The SEC has brought cases against companies
for inadequate MD&A disclosure,174 but its enforcement has been sporadic, and it
is difficult to derive clear rules from the cases that have been brought.
Even if companies provide useful MD&A statements, it is costlier for
investors to assess such information than it is for them to compare a quarterly
earnings disclosure with a projection. Long narrative discussions of long-term
prospects are difficult to process and digest into investing strategies.175 Comparison
of qualitative disclosure issued by different companies is also difficult. The SEC has
required MD&A since the early 1980s, and such disclosure did not prevent markets
from shifting increasingly to analyst projections in assessing managerial competence
towards the end of the 1980s. The relentless focus of markets on earnings
projections despite SEC mandates to disclose qualitative information through the
MD&A indicates that narrative disclosure will not divert markets from focusing
on heuristics.
It is unlikely that shifting disclosure so that it encompasses more discussion
about long-term plans by itself would change the short-term focus of periodic
disclosure. So long as market movements are driven by projections, it is unlikely
that improving the quality of long-term disclosure would check short-termism.
2. Social Disclosure
The securities laws have long mandated disclosure of information that is not
directly related to a company’s financial results. For example, companies are
required to disclose information relating to executive compensation and certain
environmental liabilities.176 Professor Cynthia Williams defines such social
disclosure expansively to “include general information about what products a
company sells, in what countries it does business, its employment and
environmental records (both domestic and global), and specified information about
a company’s community and political effects in the United States and elsewhere.”177
The hope of such social disclosure is that it will influence companies to behave in a
responsible manner that not only complies with existing laws but is ethical.178
173. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations;
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 43 SEC Docket 1330, 1344
(May 18, 1989).
174. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc., supra note 170.
175. In some industries, the MD&A is used to disclose helpful quantitative information. For
example, retail firms disclose data such as the number of store openings and closings. See, e.g., Cathy
J. Cole & Christopher L. Jones, The Usefulness of MD&A Disclosures in the Retail Industry, 19
J. ACCT., AUDITING & FIN. 361, 364 (2004).
176. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.103, 229.402 (2019).
177. See, e.g., Cynthia Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1273–74 (1999).
178. Another argument is that disclosure serves not only the interests of investors but a broader
range of stakeholders. See Ann M. Lipton, Not Everything Is About Investors: The Case for
Mandatory Stakeholder Disclosure, 37 YALE J. ON REG (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3435578 [ https://perma.cc/36BP-H3JP ] (last revised Nov. 6, 2019 ).
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Recently, there has been increasing support of social disclosure requirements.
The EU has adopted a directive relating to public company disclosure on a wide
range of social issues.179 In the United States, significant institutional investors are
increasingly seeking and incorporating social disclosure in their decision-making.180
The SEC is considering whether it should expand increasing mandatory social
disclosure.181 Professor Jill Fisch has proposed requiring companies to provide a
narrative description of major environmental issues similar to the MD&A.182
There is a substantial argument that social disclosure could shape corporate
behavior. First, the exercise of gathering information could inform the corporation
when its behavior is not socially optimal. Mandatory rules would provide a business
rationale for collecting data on its social impact. Corporate managers who prefer
socially desirable policies can use such information to spur organizational change.
A company may also discover by assessing this information that certain socially
undesirable practices adversely affect its earnings. Second, disclosure of social
information could allow investors or other parties to highlight companies that are
generating excessive social costs.183 Good disclosure could provide activists with
ammunition to use corporate governance mechanisms to pressure companies
to reform.
The question is whether social disclosure requirements will do more than
effectuate change at the margins. So long as managers face pressure to deliver
quarterly profits, they will prioritize shareholder wealth over other concerns. As
noted earlier, financial projections and disclosures are simple heuristics that are easy
for markets to quickly digest and quickly incorporate into market prices. Narrative
descriptions can provide useful information but are likely to be dominated by
quarterly results. Even if they personally value social issues,184 managers of
institutional investors have obligations and pressure to deliver strong returns.185

179. See Directive 2014/95/EU, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October
2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity
Information By Certain Large Undertakings and Groups, 2014 O.J. (L 330).
180. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams & Jill E. Fisch, Request for Rulemaking on Environmental,
Social, and Governance (ESG) Disclosure, No. 4-730, at *8 (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/
rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/GUG4-WX8A].
181. Press Release, SEC, SEC Proposes to Modernize Disclosures of Business, Legal
Proceedings, and Risk Factors Under Regulation S-K (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/
press-release/2019-148 [https://perma.cc/KDV7-EQXR].
182. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923 (2019)
(describing proposals and proposing sustainability discussion and analysis section for the annual report).
183. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 177, at 1294–95.
184. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, Companies Should Maximize Shareholder Welfare Not
Market Value, 2 J.L. FIN. & ACCT. 247 (2017) (arguing that shareholder welfare includes
social preferences).
185. The evidence that sustainable practices are correlated with market performance is
questionable at best. See, e.g., Dan Esty & Todd Cort, Corporate Sustainability Metrics: What Investors
Need and Don’t Get, 8 J. ENVTL. INVESTING 11, 15 (2017) (“We survey a wide range of studies and
analyses—and find the data and conclusions about the correlation between sustainability and
marketplace success to be divergent.”).
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Perhaps a solution would be for the SEC to create an index that measures
social responsibility that could be used to evaluate companies. Some investment
firms have already constructed such indices.186 A problem is that while an index
may provide useful information, its value is unlikely to meaningfully change on a
frequent basis. Unlike earnings numbers that change each quarter, a social
responsibility index would not often convey new information about a company that
would spur reevaluation of a company’s prospects. Thus, it would not be as
influential as quarterly earnings reports to transacting investors.187
Moreover, it is difficult to compel companies to provide meaningful social
disclosure. Companies tend to paint themselves in a generally positive light. Without
clear and meaningful metrics, social disclosure will not provide much detail about a
company’s practices. Because it is difficult to link incomplete social disclosure with
stock losses, the failure to provide meaningful social disclosure would not trigger
private securities litigation. The SEC would need to bring enforcement cases for
companies to have a significant regulatory incentive to provide
meaningful disclosure.
D. Fixing Quarterly Projections
Much of the pressure on public companies from the quarterly reporting system
comes from the compulsion to meet quarterly projections, but there has been little
consideration of whether the SEC should increase regulation relating to such
projections. Rather than changing the frequency of disclosure, it could seek to
reduce the pressure of projections on public companies. This would require the
SEC to increase rather than reduce its regulation of quarterly disclosure. If the
source of problematic projections is private ordering, government intervention
could help reconfigure such arrangements.
1.

Banning Company Projections

Because projections are typically developed by research analysts, companies
and regulation have a limited ability to influence them. However, as some
commentators have noted, companies might reduce the importance of projections
by refusing to issue their own guidance with respect to projections.188 Analysts will

186. See, e.g., Meir Statman, Socially Responsible Indexes, 32 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 100, 101–04
(2006); see also DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVEN A. DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW: TRUST,
PUBLIC BENEFIT, AND CAPITAL MARKETS 124–32 (2017) (discussing metrics for social performance).
187. See, e.g., Bill Davis et al., Performance and Impact: Can ESG Equity Portfolios Generate
Healthier Financial Returns?, 8 J. ENVTL. INVESTING 252, 254 (2017) (“For portfolio managers focused
on short-term returns, issues around data quality, availability, materiality, and diversification taken
together have given ample reasons to avoid inclusion of ESG inputs.”).
188. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST., LONG-TERM VALUE CREATION: GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR
CORPORATIONS AND INVESTORS ¶¶ 2.1-2.2 (2010) (proposing that managers avoid quarterly guidance
and instead communicate long-term plans); Dimon & Buffett, supra note 3; Fuller & Jensen, supra note
139, at 44 (“[M]anagers can refuse to collude with analysts’ expectations when they don’t fit with their
strategies and the underlying realities of their markets.”).
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typically use the company’s forecasts to develop their own projections. If analysts
did not have company guidance, then projections might be viewed as less reliable,
perhaps making it less important for companies to meet them.
The SEC could support and accelerate this process by going back to its old
policy of discouraging company projections. It could scale back the litigation safe
harbor for projections, creating the fear of liability for companies that issue
unrealistic projections.189 It could ramp up enforcement efforts to prohibit or
discourage companies from communicating with analysts in private about their
projections. It might even prohibit the inclusion of company projections in
SEC filings.
A problem with this approach is that analysts will likely continue to generate
and rely on their own projections, even if they are less reliable.190 Projections initially
arose from the securities industry and would persist even if the SEC were to
discourage them. Reducing company guidance with respect to projections could
result in more volatility in markets. It might also create even more pressure from
companies to deliver quarterly results that meet projections that they do not have
the opportunity to influence.
2. Mandating Projections
Rather than reducing company communication relating to projections, the
SEC could mandate more communication. When the SEC initially considered
changes to its policy of prohibiting projections in the 1970s, it looked at proposals
to require all public companies to make projections and include them in their SEC

189. See, e.g., ROGER L. MARTIN, FIXING THE GAME: BUBBLES, CRASHES, AND WHAT
CAPITALISM CAN LEARN FROM THE NFL 82 (2011) (arguing that PSLRA safe harbor “plainly
encourages and facilitates the penetration of the expectations market into the real market by giving
executives a powerful tool for expectations manipulation” and “should simply be repealed”).
190. A more radical approach would be to make analysts liable for inaccurate projections. If
analysts set projections too high, and the company does not meet them, the analyst could be liable for
some of the investor losses. Such a policy would create incentives for analysts to issue more
conservative projections.
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filings.191 Some commentators also argued that companies should be required to
disclose the assumptions they used in calculating such projections.192
If public companies were required to issue projections, the process by which
projections are developed would be more transparent. Public corporations would
have to take a clear position about their future performance that could be assessed
by investors. They would have an incentive to be cautious in issuing such
projections because they would be more directly accountable for meeting them.
Company projections could lower expectations when analyst projections are too
ambitious and pressure companies to deliver unrealistic results.193
Early proposals to mandate projections failed in part because of the concern
that many companies were not equipped to accurately project their earnings. But
public companies and their regulation have changed since the 1970s. After
Sarbanes-Oxley, only companies with the resources to implement and assess
internal controls can achieve and maintain their public status. As expectations for
public companies have changed, it is worth reconsidering whether mandatory
projections would be feasible.194 Even if it is too difficult for companies to issue a
precise number, regulation could permit companies to disclose ranges of
potential outcomes.
One concern might be that requiring companies to disclose projections would
mean that some companies would attempt to deceive investors by issuing
unrealistically high projections. But if companies were required to disclose the basis
behind the projection, it would reduce the risk that a projection is not rooted in
191. See Notice of Proposed Rules and Forms on Earnings Projections, Exchange Act Release
No. 5,581, 6 SEC Docket 746 (Apr. 28, 1975); see also Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 780–87 (1995) (describing proposal and its rejection). In
the accounting literature, there were proposals for companies to disclose their internal budgets and
forecasts. See, e.g., W.W. Cooper et al., Budgetary Disclosure and Other Suggestions for Improving
Accounting Reports, 43 ACCT. REV. 640 (1968). Proposals to mandate disclosure of projections have
continued to be made. See, e.g., Roger J. Dennis, Mandatory Disclosure Theory and Management
Projections: A Law and Economics Perspective, 46 MD. L. REV. 1197 (1987) (proposing mandatory
disclosure of proposals with respect to change of control transactions); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note
7, at 234 (proposing companies issue five year report that would “detail the corporation’s five-year
business plan, including projections, the assumptions underlying them, the factors likely to affect
whether the projections are met, and the corporation’s ability to control or influence these factors.”);
Note, Disclosure of Future-Oriented Information Under the Securities Laws, 88 YALE L.J. 338, 338 (1978)
(proposing “formal disclosure of financial forecasts by management”).
192. See, e.g., John G. Gillis, Legal Aspects of Corporate Forecasts, 29 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 72, 74 (1973)
(proposing guidelines for disclosing assumptions behind forecasts); William S. Gray III, Proposal for
Systematic Disclosure of Corporate Forecasts, 29 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 64, 69 (1973) (“[E]very forecast statement
should include a statement of the assumptions on which the forecast is based.”); Reiling & Burton, supra
note 70, at 53 (“A forecast should be accompanied by a statement of the major economic and operating
assumptions underlying its preparation.”).
193. See, e.g., Reiling & Burton, supra note 70, at 50 (“Company forecasts would at least provide
a check on the enthusiasm of some transported professionals.”).
194. Chinese securities regulation mandates that companies issue projections and requires
sanctions if such projections are not met. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Liebman & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Reputational
Sanctions in China’s Securities Market, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 952 n.86 (2008) (finding twenty percent
of sanctions imposed by Chinese securities exchanges were for failure to meet projections).

First to Printer_Park (Do Not Delete)

3/17/2020 7:31 AM

2020] DO THE SECURITIES LAWS PROMOTE SHORT-TERMISM?

1033

reality. While it might be initially difficult to develop rules governing the
assumptions that should be disclosed,195 over time, industry standards could
develop. The disclosure of forecast assumptions is not unprecedented. The United
Kingdom Takeover Code has required since the 1960s that any “profit
forecast . . . must include the principal assumptions on which the profit forecast is
based.”196 Credit rating agencies publish extensive guides to the methodology they
use in predicting the risk a company will default on its debt.197
Another concern is that if all companies issue projections, there will be an
increase in securities litigation directed at those companies that miss a projection.
Even if managers are cautious in developing forecasts, there will be cases where
they will not be met. However, as noted earlier, the current safe harbor only permits
liability when a projection is knowingly false and not accompanied by meaningfully
cautionary language. This provision should be sufficient to deter suits that do no
more than allege that a company projection has not been met. If that safe harbor
proves insufficient, it could be bolstered to reduce frivolous litigation.
It is uncertain whether mandating company projections would result in a
system where projections do not set unrealistic expectations. Even if companies
issue projections, analysts could still come to a different consensus. If corporate
projections are understood as being overly cautious, then analysts would create their
own forecasts that companies would feel pressured to meet. On the other hand, if
companies were required to take a clear position with respect to their quarterly
projections, they would be forced to take more control over the way that short-term
expectations are set. Rather than complaining that they are subject to unfair
short-term metrics while benefitting from high market expectations about their
future performance, corporate managers would have to provide investors with a
realistic assessment of their upcoming quarterly results.
Instead of reducing the frequency of disclosure, the SEC should seriously
consider whether increasing disclosure relating to public company projections
would be a way of checking short-termism.

195. The need for transparency would have to be balanced with the risk that disclosure of
assumptions would help the issuer’s competitors. See, e.g., Asher v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 733
(7th Cir. 2004) (observing that while “investors would like to have . . . full disclosure of the assumptions
and calculations behind the projections . . . [m]any of the assumptions and calculations would be more
useful to a firm’s rivals than to its investors”).
196. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS K5 (12th ed. 2016) (U.K.),
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/
2008/11/code.pdf [ https://perma.cc/PY5Z-6GSN ]. Indeed, supporters of permitting projections in
SEC filings in the 1970s pointed to the UK example. See, e.g., John Hull, Profit Forecasts—The English
Experience, in PUBLIC REPORTING OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL FORECASTS, supra note 14, at 19,
20, 29.
197. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 113, at 1445–72 (describing methodologies and their flaws).
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3. A More Vigorous Duty to Correct
Another way of addressing problems caused by market expectations that are
set too high would be to increase the duty of public companies to correct unrealistic
projections made by third parties. If analyst projections are materially
overoptimistic, a public company could be required to respond by issuing a more
realistic projection. Courts have generally required companies to “update opinions
and projections . . . if the original opinions or projections have become misleading
as the result of intervening events.”198 This duty has been generally applied only to
projections issued by a company and it could be extended to require companies to
intervene when it knows that analyst projections are unrealistic.199 While there
would be a concern of increasing the liability faced by public companies,200 courts
and the SEC could limit such suits to cases where management failed to act despite
a high degree of knowledge that an external projection is too high. Many companies
already preempt projection misses, but others may be wary of doing so because they
want to fuel market optimism. A stronger duty to disclose could help increase the
incentive of companies to correct analyst forecasts.
On the other hand, such a duty to correct would be difficult to implement. At
the time an analyst projection is made, a company may not know that it is unrealistic.
Managers will have to make difficult judgment calls about when to issue an update.
It will be challenging to determine when the failure to update is made in good faith
or not. Private litigation would increase and would often not clearly resolve whether
the duty was violated.
***
Of the four proposals to address the short-termism of quarterly reporting, the
most promising is to encourage transparency and collaboration between investors
and issuers in setting quarterly projections. Rather than reduce the frequency of
periodic disclosure, increasing disclosure obligations with respect to projections
should be explored as a way of reducing the problem of short-termism. Such reform
of projections, though, poses its own challenges, and it is far from clear that
securities law can effectively check short-termism in public companies.

198. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Donald
C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1644, 1665–71 (2004).
199. The possibility that issuers should have some obligation to correct analyst forecasts has
been long noted. See FAF Special Comm. on Corp. Forecasts, Proposals by the Federation for Systematic
Disclosure, in DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE FORECASTS TO THE INVESTOR, supra note 80, at 26 (“[I]t
is often desirable for management to make public correction of published forecasts by analysts or other
outsiders which vary substantially from internal estimates.”).
200. Courts have thus differed with respect to how broadly they read the duty to update
company projections. Compare In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432–33 (3d
Cir. 1997) (noting that broad duty to update projections would “deter companies from providing this
information—a result contrary to the SEC’s goal of encouraging the voluntary disclosure of company
forecasts”), with Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[C]urrent SEC
policy contradicts the rationale that investors do not rely at all on projections.”).
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IV. STRONG SECURITIES LAW AND WEAK CORPORATE LAW
Quarterly disclosure is part of a system of securities regulation that has
increasingly promoted the interests of transacting investors. Public companies are
also governed by corporate law, which gives a corporation significant freedom to
consider its long-term interests. Some of the short-term pressure created by strong
securities law is checked by corporate law that only weakly regulates the discretion
of corporate managers.201 Moreover, some of the weakness of corporate law is made
possible by the increasing strength of securities law. Because securities regulation
favors transacting investors, Congress and the SEC should be cautious in increasing
the power of short-term shareholders through federal corporate law.
A. The Securities Laws and Short-termism
The primary purpose of the securities laws is to protect investors. But as I
argued extensively in an earlier article, this protection primarily extends to the subset
of transacting investors—those who purchase or sell securities.202 For example, only
an investor who buys a stock while it is inflated by fraud can recover damages under
Rule 10b-5.203 Because it focuses on facilitating fair transactions, securities
regulation tends to further the interests of short-term investors who transact more
frequently than long-term investors.
The mandate of quarterly disclosure particularly favors investors with shorter
time horizons. Shifting to annual or semiannual disclosure would mean that
valuations would be less accurate throughout the year than with quarterly disclosure.
Investors who buy and hold a stock for years are less concerned that its market price
is accurate on a quarterly basis than investors who are constantly trading on new
developments that affect a company’s prospects.204 Information traders who seek
to predict the short-term performance of a public corporation can profit from
frequent disclosure events. Investors that trade frequently also benefit from the
lower volatility and trading spreads associated with disclosure.205 Even though

201. In noting the weakness of corporate law in regulating the discretion of managers, I do not
mean to suggest that all aspects of corporate law are weak or should be weak. For example, corporate
law does not confer managers the discretion to steal from the company and such a strong prohibition
is necessary even with strong securities law.
202. See Park, supra note 15.
203. Thus, only an investor who purchases or sells a security can bring a claim for securities
fraud under Rule 10b-5. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749 (1975).
204. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 803 (1973) (noting that “market information is primarily
relevant to short-term traders”).
205. Disclosure increases confidence in the market price of a stock and lowers the transaction
costs at which trades will occur. See, e.g., Paul M. Healy et al., Stock Performance and Intermediation
Changes Surrounding Sustained Increases in Disclosure, 16 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 485 (1999) (finding
higher returns and liquidity for firms that increase disclosure); Christian Leuz & Robert E. Verrecchia,
The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure, 38 J. ACCT. RES. 91 (2000) (finding lower bid-ask
spreads for German firms that committed to greater disclosure); Michael Welker, Disclosure Policy,
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mandatory disclosure can be used by a wide range of investors and even
stakeholders, frequent traders have the most need for quarterly disclosure.
In addition to quarterly disclosure, other securities law policies can have the
unintended effect of promoting short-termism. For example, as institutional
investors increased their trading, they pushed the SEC to eliminate the fixed
commissions charged by exchanges.206 After the SEC prohibited fixed commissions
in 1975,207 the resulting decline in commission rates drove down the costs of trading
and increased market participation.208 A little more than a decade later, criticism
arose about how the increase in trading volume had negative effects such as
pressuring corporate managers to focus on short-term performance, resulting in
proposals for a tax on securities transactions.209 While few would agree that we
should go back to markets with high transaction costs, policies that benefitted
transacting investors put pressure on corporate managers to constantly satisfy
the market.
The fraud-on-the-market presumption is another example of a securities law
doctrine that favors short-term investors. Rather than requiring a showing that a
purchaser read a misleading disclosure document, the presumption allows reliance
by the purchaser on the integrity of the market price of a stock that trades in an
efficient market.210 Even though a stock price is not precisely accurate at every point
in time, this presumption enables investors to argue they were entitled to assume
that the price at which they transacted was not inflated by fraud.211 Short-term
investors are more likely to be in a position to invoke the fraud-on-the-market
presumption because they are more likely to have purchased stock during the period
of fraud. Long-term investors are less likely to have transacted during the period of
fraud but bear part of the costs of defending the securities class action made
possible by the presumption.212
It is important to acknowledge that some aspects of securities regulation also
serve the interests of long-term shareholders. Mandatory disclosure allows all
Information Asymmetry, and Liquidity in Equity Markets, 11 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 801 (1995) (finding
negative relationship between disclosure and bid-ask spreads).
206. See Fixed Commission Rates on Exchange Transactions, Exchange Act Release
No. 11,093, 5 SEC Docket 438, 439–48 (Nov. 8, 1974).
207. See Adoption of Securities Exchange Act Rule 19b-3, Exchange Act Release No. 11,203, 6
SEC Docket 138, 155–56 ( Jan. 23, 1975).
208. See, e.g., Jason Zweig, Lessons of May Day 1975 Ring True Today: The Intelligent Investor,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lessons-of-may-day-1975-ring-true-todaythe-intelligent-investor-1430450405 [ https://perma.cc/C5PM-Y4L9 ]
(observing
that
after
deregulation of commissions, “[t]rading boomed, investors flocked back to the markets and brokerages
minted money for decades”).
209. See, e.g., Stiglitz, supra note 146; Summers & Summers, supra note 109. The proposal to tax
securities transactions continues to be occasionally floated. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INST., OVERCOMING
SHORT-TERMISM, supra note 151, at 3.
210. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 277–78 (2014).
211. Id. at 268.
212. James J. Park, Shareholder Compensation as Dividend, 108 MICH. L. REV. 323, 336–38
(2009) (describing transfer from non-class shareholders to class shareholders).
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shareholders to monitor managers. Anti-fraud prohibitions deter companies from
destroying value through short-term accounting fraud. And as noted earlier, there
are efforts to reformulate securities disclosure so that it promotes social goals.
Nonetheless, as securities regulation has expanded its reach over the decades,
it has generally strived to make market prices as accurate as possible. Protecting
investors has had the effect of subjecting public companies to a system where they
must take care to consistently deliver results that satisfy the expectations of
short-term investors.
B. Balancing Securities Law and Corporate Law
In contrast to securities law, which looks after the interests of investors when
they purchase or sell a stock, corporate law protects the interests of investors while
they own a stock.213 Rather than narrowly policing the fairness of transactions,
corporate law must look after the diverse interests of all shareholders—some of
which are short-term holders, others of which are long-term holders.214 This point
was recognized as early as the late 1970s, with the Business Roundtable explaining
that “[t]he owners have an interest in balancing short-range and long-term
profitability, in considering the political and social viability of the enterprise over
time and in adjusting to the global environment in which it operates.”215 Even as
securities regulation has evolved so that it increasingly favors transacting investors,
corporate law has given managers significant discretion to consider a public
corporation’s long-term interests. Weak corporate law can balance strong
securities law.216
1. State Corporate Law
States that competently strike the right balance between competing interests
should be more attractive for corporations that seek jurisdictions with the best
regulation.217 A state like Delaware, which dominates the competition,218 must be
careful not to systematically favor one set of investors over another. Moreover, as
213. See Park, supra note 15, at 137.
214. See id.
215. Bus. Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2099 (1978). Professors Barzuza and Talley model the tension
between long-term and short-term interests and suggest that such interests may counteract each other
within the corporation. See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Short-Termism and Long-Termism 45–46
(Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 526, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2731814 [ https:/
/perma.cc/3438-VBJQ ].
216. Some Delaware judges have noted that Delaware can play a role in encouraging a
long-term corporate focus. See, e.g., Jacobs, supra note 25, at 1660–64 (proposing role for Delaware in
reviving “patient capital”).
217. On the benefits of state competition for charters, see generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993); Roberta Romano, The States As a Laboratory: Legal
Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209 (2006).
218. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely
Walk: Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 553–54 (2002).
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Professor Mark Roe has demonstrated, the dynamic of state competition is
complicated by the presence and possibility of federal regulation.219
The structure of state corporate law better enables it to balance short-term and
long-term interests than federal securities law. Partly because of its need to consider
diverse interests,220 important aspects of corporate law are framed as broad
standards that are applied by judges to particular disputes.221 Professor Edward
Rock describes Delaware case-by-case decision-making as conveying guidance to
parties while retaining the flexibility to decide future cases.222 Such standards can be
read broadly or narrowly depending on the circumstances. In contrast, securities law
is mainly concerned with the goal of facilitating fair transactions. Specific
regulations can provide the clarity necessary to achieve that goal. Thus, important
policies such as periodic disclosure are implemented through rules about the
frequency and content of reports rather than through a broad standard instructing
companies to disclose material information whenever they believe it
is appropriate.223
As markets have become increasingly focused on short-term performance, and
securities regulation increased pressure on managers to deliver results, state
corporate law has prevented short-termism from substantially distorting corporate
decision-making. It has shielded managers so they are not judged as quickly when
they fail to meet short-term forecasts. Moreover, as policies like quarterly disclosure
protect the interests of transacting investors, there is less need for corporate law to
provide such protection.
a. Weak Corporate Law as a Check on Strong Securities Law
State corporate law has often been criticized for entrenching managers.
However, such an approach is on firmer footing with the rise of markets that favor
short-term interests. In the 1980s, the approval by Delaware courts of managerial
discretion to implement strong takeover defenses was a response to an environment
where hostile bidders were increasingly aggressive in making unsolicited bids for

219. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 635 (2003) (“[T]he
state race analysis must be inconclusive because we live in a federal system.”).
220. It is worth noting that there are other reasons why corporate law is ambiguous. See, e.g.,
Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1421–32
(2008) (contending that ambiguity of corporate law reflects ambivalence about the consistency of
shareholder and societal interests); Lynn M. LoPucki, Corporate Charter Competition, 102
MINN. L. REV. 2101, 2145–49 (2018) (arguing that ambiguity allows Delaware to avoid criticism).
221. While Delaware doctrine can also set forth clear rules, such rules often have exceptions or
judges can interpret the facts so that the rules do not apply.
222. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016–19 (1997).
223. Some elements of securities regulation, though, are set forth through broadly worded
principles. See, e.g., James J. Park, The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation, 57 DUKE L.J. 625,
642–62 (2007) (describing examples of principles-based securities enforcement).
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control of public companies.224 There was a fear that in certain circumstances, bids
made in reference to the current market price could undervalue a company.
Delaware courts thus recognized that managers can consider the promise of a
long-term strategy in rejecting an offer225 and only in limited circumstances must
sell the company for the highest price available.226 State takeover statutes made it
even more difficult for hostile bids to succeed, tilting the balance
towards managers.227
As the number of hostile takeover bids declined in the 1990s, quarterly
earnings projections provided markets with a new way of pressuring managers to
maximize short-term performance.228 But state corporate law gives them significant
discretion to resist short-term pressure. Even when a company sees its stock price
fall when it misses a quarterly earnings projection, takeover defenses permit it to
resist for some time an opportunistic hostile bidder. The business judgment rule
will protect managers from shareholder suits seeking damages for such a decline.229
It is notable that corporate governance has recently innovated to provide
public companies with even more insulation from short-term pressures caused by
projections and other sources. Dual-class stock that gives founders control of the
governance of a corporation regardless of their economic stake in the company can
be understood as motivated by concern that markets will discount the long-term
strategies of innovative technology companies.230 Academic proposals to give
long-term shareholders more voting power than short-term shareholders reflect a
sense that markets have become too disruptive.231 State corporate law has generally
not intervened at this point to prohibit such corporate governance innovation.
Whether or not these new corporate governance developments are the
product of a genuine concern about problematic incentives caused by short-term
pressure or the selfish interests of managers is difficult to assess. There are good
arguments on both sides about whether corporate law and governance has shifted
224. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the
Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 873–79 (2002).
225. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
226. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
227. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian et al., Is Delaware’s Antitakeover Statute Unconstitutional?
Evidence from 1988–2008, 65 BUS. LAW. 685, 705 (2010).
228. Activist shareholders have also played a role in generating such pressure. See, e.g., Strine,
supra note 7, at 8. However, the impact of activist shareholders is not as pervasive as that of earnings
projections.
229. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule As Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004).
230. See, e.g., Bradford D. Jordan et al., Growth Opportunities, Short-Term Market Pressure, and
Dual-Class Share Structure, 41 J. CORP. FIN. 304 (2016) (testing hypothesis that dual class shares reduce
short-term pressure); cf. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision,
125 YALE L.J. 560, 580 (2016) (arguing that concentrated ownership addresses “[t]he risk of investors
disrupting the entrepreneur’s pursuit of her idiosyncratic vision exists even when the firm is publicly
traded and investors are using stock prices as a proxy for the firm’s performance”).
231. See, e.g., Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased
Voting, 54 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541 (2015).
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too far in one direction.232 However, to the extent that securities regulation favors
short-term investors, there is a stronger justification for corporate law that gives
managers broader discretion to implement long-term policies.
The competition for corporate charters led early critics of state regulation of
corporate law to hypothesize that Delaware had an incentive to favor managers at
the expense of shareholders. Greater protection through expansion of the securities
laws was the solution to weak state corporate law. But as the quarterly reporting
system has evolved, the core mandates of the securities laws have been successful
in supporting markets that vigorously monitor the performance of managers. It is
possible to view Delaware law and its deference to the authority of corporate boards
more favorably in this world. There is an argument that weak corporate law is
essential to balancing strong securities law.
b. Strong Securities Law Allows for Weak Corporate Law
Another way of thinking of the relationship between corporate and securities
law is that as securities law has grown stronger, there is less of a need for corporate
law to protect investors. If securities law became weaker through the elimination of
quarterly disclosure, state corporate law would likely have to do more to
protect investors.
Strong securities law has emerged as an enabler of corporate governance. As
Professor Jeffrey Gordon has argued, as markets became more efficient, they
helped enable independent directors to better monitor managers.233 Such efficiency,
in part, can be traced to securities law reforms in the 1970s that made trading less
costly and disclosure more uniform and reliable. In turn, as Professors Kahan and
Rock have noted, as corporate governance has improved, there is less reason to
worry about the weak corporate law reflected by takeover defenses.234
Delaware’s recent law on appraisal illustrates how the quarterly reporting
system can lessen the need for investor protection that might be provided by
corporate law. The availability of appraisal rights ensures that the interests of
minority shareholders are protected when a board decides to sell a company. In an
appraisal proceeding, objecting shareholders argue to the court that the offered
consideration does not represent the “fair value” of those shares.235

232. Compare Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1679–81 (describing how board insulation can result in
long-term harm to corporation), with Martijn Cremers et al., Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation,
94 WASH. U. L. REV. 261, 270 (2016) (proposing “changes to revitalize board authority to resist activist
attacks”). But see Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the
Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 473 (2014) (observing that
the evidence may support the conclusion “that the current status quo, with all of its real world human
blemishes, strikes, as a general matter, a reasonable balance between stockholder and
management power”).
233. See Gordon, supra note 34.
234. Kahan & Rock, supra note 224.
235. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h) (2019).
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In a series of recent decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court held that when a
company’s stock trades in an efficient market, its market value should be given
significant weight in determining its fair value.236 In the appraisal case arising out of
the management buy-out of the computer company Dell, the court reversed the
Court of Chancery’s decision awarding a higher price to objecting shareholders
based on its own discounted cash flow analysis.237 In doing so, it noted Dell’s
inability to sell its “long-term vision” of the company while “it kept failing the
quarterly tests on which so many market analysts focus.”238 The court concluded
that the Court of Chancery’s “failure to give the resulting [deal] price heavy weight”
was an abuse of discretion.239
The court thus assumed that the quarterly reporting system was the best way
of measuring the adequacy of the deal price.240 But in emphasizing the market’s
assessment of a company’s performance through projections, the court accepted
without question the reliance of the market on short-term performance metrics.241
The court did not recognize in its opinion the potential inadequacy of such
metrics,242 rejecting the Court of Chancery’s argument that “‘investor myopia’
created a valuation gap” that distorted the deal price.243
Regardless of whether Delaware’s recent emphasis on market value in
appraisal cases is warranted,244 it is possible in part because of the work of the
236. See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. 2017);
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 369-72 (Del. 2017); see also James
D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in
Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323, 328 (2018) (concluding that “existing market forces
and shareholder oversight are sufficient to curtail managerial misconduct but that the watchful eye of
judicial review may need to be revived if those vehicles for shareholder oversight are curtailed”).
237. See Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 5.
238. Id. at 10.
239. Id. at 35.
240. For a critique of this position, see Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Flawed Corporate
Finance of Dell and DFC Global, 68 EMORY L.J. 221 (2018). But see Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts,
Asking the Right Question: The Statutory Right of Appraisal and Efficient Markets (European Corp.
Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 428, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3279838 [ https://
perma.cc/SY65-CTXW ].
241. The Court also looked to a company’s short-term performance in a later case, noting that
a bidder knew of a target’s strong quarterly performance in making its bid before the results were
released to the market in concluding that the market price undervalued the company. See Verition
Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., C.A. No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at
*20–21 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).
242. Managers seeking to take a company private have an incentive to manipulate projections
and performance downwards to drive the market price down. Though there may not be evidence that
such a dynamic was at play in the Dell case, there is an argument that courts should closely scrutinize
management buyouts. See Iman Anabtawi, Predatory Management Buyouts, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1285,
1325–29 (2016).
243. Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d at 16.
244. The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent appraisal decisions can be understood as a reaction
against speculators who purchase stock to bring appraisal claims. See, e.g., Charles R. Korsmo & Minor
Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551,
1572–73 (2015). If appraisal claims were mainly brought by long-term shareholders, there might be
more sympathy for such claims. There is evidence that these claims have merit, see, e.g., id. at 1594–95
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securities laws in facilitating the short-term efficiency of markets. If quarterly
disclosure were eliminated, there would be a case for stronger appraisal rights
because there would be less confidence that market prices would reflect the
fundamental value of the company. Delaware doctrine has thus been shaped in
some ways by the efforts of the securities laws and would be affected if those laws
were to change.
2.

Federal Corporate Law

In a provocative article, Professors Goshen and Hannes recently announced
The Death of Corporate Law.245 They contend that as shareholders have become more
sophisticated, they have less need for corporate law. While their thesis may hold
with respect to the state corporate law created by Delaware courts, it does not with
respect to the corporate law provisions that are increasingly part of the federal
securities laws. Such federal corporate law has significantly expanded over the last
couple of decades.
Indeed, the influence of institutional shareholders has been a significant driver
of corporate law that has increased the obligations of public companies. In the wake
of the securities frauds of the early 2000s, and the financial crisis of the late 2000s,
Congress sought to reassure investors by passing federal legislation to reduce the
risk of fraud and mismanagement. Public companies were required to increase the
independence of their boards in verifying the accuracy of financial statements and
approving executive compensation packages.246 Shareholders were granted the right
to periodically opine on executive compensation packages.247 Such legislation
reflected the desire of investors to play a greater role in corporate governance.248
Far from relying on their own abilities to monitor, some investors have demanded
protection through governance reforms that increase shareholder power.249
There have been many objections to the expansion of federal corporate law.
This Article’s analysis provides an additional reason to limit the use of the federal
(presenting evidence that appraisal claims tend to target deals with lower premiums), but the optics of
benefitting speculators has made it difficult for Delaware to encourage such claims.
245. Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94
N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019).
246. See SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2010); DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 952, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3 (2010).
247. See DODD-FRANK ACT § 951.
248. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance: What Is the
“Progressive” Agenda?, 2018 BYU L. REV. 267, 289 (noting that Dodd-Frank reforms increasing
shareholder power were sought by union pension funds); Roberta S. Karmel, Should a Duty to the
Corporation Be Imposed on Institutional Shareholders?, 60 BUS. LAW. 1, 2 (2004) (“In the wake of recent
corporate scandals, institution[al investors] have been demanding more rights, for example, more rights
with respect to the nomination of corporate directors.”); see also James J. Park, The Limits of the Right
to Sell and the Rise of Federal Corporate Law, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 159 (2017) (arguing that corporate
scandals have created pressure to protect investors from losses caused by corporate mismanagement).
249. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1353,
1359 (2010) (“Subsidization of investor empowerment through regulatory action aligns with the SEC’s
mission of investor protection and shareholder primacy.”).
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securities laws to increase the power of shareholders. The core provisions of federal
securities regulation already favor short-term investors. Expanding federal law to
increase the corporate rights of shareholders could in some circumstances tilt
regulation to decisively favor short-term investors.
For example, consider the example of shareholder proposals. The SEC has
long mandated that proposals relating to a company’s “ordinary business
operations” can be excluded from the company proxy statement.250 This rule helps
ensure that federal proxy regulation does not undermine the corporate law business
judgment rule. The SEC has also deferred to the judgment of Delaware in limiting
the ability of shareholders to adopt bylaws that go beyond regulating procedural
issues.251 Reformers have proposed increasing the power of shareholders to dictate
corporate policy and adopt bylaws.252
But given the potency of the quarterly reporting system in monitoring
management, it is unclear that shareholders need additional power to check
managerial agency costs. Such powers might be abused to favor short-term interests
and push through questionable cosmetic changes. On the other hand, shareholder
proposals can be used as a mechanism to spur discussion of social and
environmental issues that affect the long-term health of the corporation.253 Thus,
in considering shareholder proposal reform, Congress and the SEC should attempt
to limit such regulation to measures that facilitate dialogue about issues relating to
the long-term health of the corporation rather than its short-term performance.
CONCLUSION
The recent proposals to reform the quarterly reporting system highlight an
underexamined and troubling possibility—that the securities laws tend to serve the
interests of short-term investors. Securities regulation has not been the only driver
of short-termism, but it has supported it in significant ways. This Article has shown
that the frequency of disclosure is not as important a driver of short-termism as the
projections that now judge managerial performance. Moreover, it is unclear that
such short-termism significantly affects public companies except in particular
circumstances. Thus, rather than take the radical step of reducing the frequency of
periodic disclosure, the SEC should consider more modest reforms such as
increasing disclosure relating to projections.
250. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(7) (1984).
251. CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008).
252. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business
Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Management by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 719–24 (2016)
(describing efforts to read business operations exclusion narrowly); Jill E. Fisch, Governance by
Contract: The Implications for Corporate Bylaws, 106 CAL. L. REV. 373, 402–03 (2018) (noting conflicting
views about increasing power of shareholders to adopt bylaws).
253. See, e.g., TONELLO, supra note 17, at 15 (“Shareholder proposals have become the tool
preferred by institutional investors to encourage the discussion of a variety of social, environmental, or
corporate governance issues that are intimately connected with the company’s long-term strategy and
crucial to the health of its business.”).
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Scholars and policymakers should be attentive to the tendency of securities
law to favor short-term investors. As securities law grows stronger, the case that
corporate law should give managers discretion to consider long-term interests also
becomes stronger. Increasing shareholder power through federal corporate law
could give too much power to short-term investors that are already favored by
securities law.

